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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis consist of three self-contained papers linked by a common topic: positive and
normative analysis of public policy when human capital investment is risky and private
insurance markets against labor income risk are missing. The main reason for the incom-
pleteness of human capital markets is an informational friction: the work effort choice of
employed households and the search effort choice of unemployed households are in gen-
eral publicly not observable. Hence, wages and unemployment benefit payments cannot be
made contingent on the households’ effort choices. The informational asymmetry induces a
moral hazard friction which prevents private insurance markets against human capital risk
to develop.1 The failure of private insurance markets makes room for welfare improving
public policies that provide some insurance against labor income and employment risk. In
addition, as shown in the third paper (chapter 4 of the thesis), publicly provided consump-
tion services leave income risk unaffected but reduces consumption risk. This relationship
is not taken into account by the households’ portfolio decisions. The presence of idiosyn-
cratic uninsurable labor income risk makes public policies that encourage more risk taking
beneficial.
All three papers build on the human capital based endogenous growth model with idiosyn-
cratic human capital risk introduced by Krebs (2003). The key property of this framework
is the analytical tractability despite the fact that idiosyncratic labor income and employ-
1For a more detailed argument for missing insurance markets against labor income and employment
risk, see, e.g., Arrow (1963) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
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ment shocks translate into household specific income histories which leads to ex-post het-
erogeneity with respect to individual wealth holdings. The analytical tractability stems
from two assumptions: homothetic preferences and budget sets in which disposable income
is linear homogenous in wealth. Taken together, both assumptions lead to consumption-
saving decisions that are linear homogenous in wealth, which simplifies the market clearing
substantially. Specifically, the equilibrium allocation can be found without solving for the
complete wealth distribution, which stands in strong contrast to the standard incomplete
market models discussed, e.g., in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).2 The first and second
paper of this thesis extend Krebs (2003) to include search model of the labor market, and
the third paper introduces publicly provided consumption services. All modifications are
made such that the key property, the analytical tractability of the basic framework, is
preserved.
The first paper (chapter 2 of this thesis) is joint work with Tom Krebs and introduces
a labor market search model in which unemployed households choose their search effort.
After having established some characterization results of the competitive equilibrium, we
apply a calibrated version of the model economy to evaluate employment, growth and,
in particular, welfare effects of the recent major labor market reform in Germany, that
was implemented in 2005 and 2006. The second paper (chapter 3 of this thesis) is single
authored and builds on the model developed in the previous paper, but in contrast of
making a positive statement on the effect of labor market reforms, I now take a normative
approach and analyzed the optimal unemployment insurance system when the households’
search effort decisions are only private information such that the government cannot make
benefit payments conditional on the exerted search effort. The third paper (chapter 4 of
this thesis) is joint work with Tom Krebs and introduces publicly provided consumption
services that are financed through capital, labor and consumption taxes. Because there is
an implicit shift from risky private consumption towards risk-free publicly provided con-
sumption services that is not taken into account by the households’ optimization decision,
distortative tax systems may be welfare improving. In this paper, we take a normative
approach and derive the optimal welfare improving tax system. The rest of the general
introduction provides a short overview of the three papers including a preview on the
2See Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) for partial equilibrium models that exploit this property,
and Stokey (2009) for a general equilibrium model.
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results.
1.1 A Macroeconomic Model for the Evaluation of
Labor Market Reforms
We develop a tractable macroeconomic model with employment risk and labor market
search in order to evaluate the effects of labor market reform on unemployment, growth,
and welfare. The model has a large number of risk-averse households who can invest
in risk-free physical capital and risky human capital. Unemployed households receive
unemployment benefits and decide upon the search effort.
The paper contributes to the literature with respect to two dimensions: First, we present
a theoretical characterization result that facilitates the computation of equilibria substan-
tially. In particular, we show that the the key property of the equilibrium allocation
is preserved. Thus, portfolio choices, search effort decisions, and the aggregate capital-
to-labor ratio, can be characterized without solving for the complete underlying wealth
distribution.
Second, we calibrate the model to German data and use the calibrated model economy
to simulate the macroeconomic effects of the German labor market reforms of 2005 and
2006 (Hartz Reforms). We find three major effects of the 2005-reform, which implemented
a reduction in benefit payments to long-run unemployed households: First, the equilib-
rium unemployment rate has fallen by approximately 1.1 percentage points from 7.5 to
6.4 percent. Second, the reduction in unemployment has been the result of an increase
in the search effort by long-term and by short-term unemployed households. The lat-
ter have contributed to almost 40 percent of the total effect on the unemployment rate.
Third, employed and short-term unemployed households have experienced significant wel-
fare gains, whereas the long-term unemployed have lost in welfare terms. The effects of the
2006-reform, which implemented a substantial reduction in the eligibility period to high
unemployment benefit, are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively much smaller.
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1.2 Optimal Unemployment Insurance in General Equi-
librium
This paper uses the dynamic general equilibrium search model of the labor market devel-
oped in chapter 2 of this thesis to compute an optimal unemployment insurance scheme
when search effort choices are only private information of the households. In contrast to the
existing literature on optimal unemployment insurance, we first provide a macroeconomic
(general equilibrium) perspective, second allow for precautionary saving, and third preserve
the analytical tractability in the sense that the optimal unemployment insurance system
can be characterized without solving for the complete underlying wealth distribution. The
combination of all three properties – which have quantitatively and computationally im-
portant implications – is unique to the literature.
Households are risk-averse and decide upon consumption, saving, portfolio composition,
and search effort. The latter is unobservable to the government which causes a moral hazard
friction. Despite the ex-post heterogeneity due to different employment histories. We set
up a mixed social planner – Ramsey problem, that preserves the wealth independence of the
equilibrium allocation and the social planner solution. Specifically, the government chooses
wealth independent transfer rates subject to firstly, the households’ consumption-saving
decision and search effort choices, which is the Ramsey part of government’s optimization
problem, and secondly, the portfolio allocation, which is the social planner part of the
government’s optimization problem.
The main results are as follows: First, conditional on being employed, the social planner
provides full insurance. This is due to the fact that there are no moral hazard frictions for
currently employed households. Second, the optimal unemployment benefit rate is inde-
pendent of the unemployment duration. Third, while the net benefit rate for unemployed
households is quite low, there are high rewards for successful job finders of 134 percent of
their labor income.
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1.3 Human Capital Risk, Public Consumption, and
Optimal Taxation
This paper studies the optimal tax policy when, first, households make portfolio decisions
between a risk-free investment opportunity (physical capital) and a risky investment oppor-
tunity (human capital) and, second, the government provides public consumption services
that are beneficial to the households. More specifically, we show that in case that public
consumption services are less risky than human capital and households derive utility from
these public consumption services, there is less investment in the risky asset than socially
optimal. Hence, there exists a welfare improving tax policy that distorts the households’
portfolio decision towards the risky asset – human capital.
There is a straightforward economic intuition for the sub-optimality of the undistorted
competitive equilibrium. By choosing their portfolio, households determine the mean and
the volatility of their return to total investment and hence of their individual consumption
growth. When making their investment decision, households take the provision of public
consumption services as given. However, in aggregate more investment in the high-return
risky asset also increases output and thus the provision of the publicly provided consump-
tion good. Hence, in the undistorted competitive equilibrium households invest less in the
risky asset than socially optimal.
We formalize the above intuition using a version of the endogenous growth model with
incomplete markets introduced by Krebs (2003) and augment it by a government sector that
provides risk-free public consumption services. The government sets linear capital, labor
and consumption taxes. We show that in this framework, it is always optimal to encourage
more risk taking by subsidizing the risky investment opportunity – human capital.
The quantitative analysis reveals that switching from an environment, in which the tax
rates on physical and human capital are zero, to the optimal tax system leads to only
small welfare gains. The reason for this is the presence of strong general equilibrium
effects. Specifically, increasing the subsidy on human capital investment makes human
capital more abundant and thus reduces the return to human capital. However, allowing for
endogenous labor-leisure choices breaks the strong general equilibrium effect: the optimal
human capital subsidy becomes substantial and induces considerable welfare gains.
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Chapter 2
A Macroeconomic Model for the
Evaluation of Labor Market Reforms
2.1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that individual households face a substantial amount of
labor income risk.1 In particular, employed workers face the risk of becoming unemployed.
In most countries, the government provides insurance against this type of risk through the
payment of unemployment benefits. Other things being equal, the provision of unemploy-
ment insurance increases the welfare of risk-averse households. However, unemployment
benefits also discourage unemployed households from exerting search effort thereby raising
the overall unemployment rate. When employment drops, so does aggregate output. In
designing the unemployment insurance system, governments therefore have to weigh the
insurance benefits against the costs of distorted incentives.2
Although the incentive-insurance tradeoff is already present in a simple one-tiered unem-
1Using individual data on labor income dynamics, estimates for the standard deviation of labor income
range from 0.15 in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) over 0.19 in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) up to 0.25
in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) focus on the specific
issue of labor income dynamics after job displacement and find that long run earnings are on average 25
percent below the pre-displacement rate for long-tenured workers. For a review of the job displacement
literature, see Kletzer (1998).
2See, e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and
Lentz (2009).
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ployment benefit system, governments often run multi-tiered unemployment benefit sys-
tems with falling benefits schedules in order to deal with the incentive-insurance tradeoff
more efficiently.3 In 2005 and 2006, the German government implemented two major labor
market reforms, the so called Hartz Reforms, in order to establish a more pronounced two-
tiered unemployment insurance system to fight the steadily increasing unemployment rate
in Germany. The 2005-reform reduced the benefit payments in the second tier, whereas the
2006-reform implemented a sharp reduction in the length of the eligibility period for high
benefit payments in the first tier. Both reforms put more emphasis on the incentive effect
of the unemployment system. Obviously, such reforms tend to reduce the unemployment
rate, but the welfare effect is ambiguous, due to the above mentioned tradeoff. In this
paper, we develop a tractable macroeconomic model, and use a calibrated version of the
model to evaluate the quantitative effects of the Hartz Reforms on unemployment, growth,
and welfare.
Our model combines the incomplete markets model developed in Krebs (2003, 2006)4 with
the labor market search model introduced by Benhabib and Bull (1983). Similar to Krebs
(2003, 2006), there is a large number of risk-averse households who invest in risk-free
physical capital and risky human capital. Investment in human capital is risky due to wage
risk and employment risk. Following Benhabib and Bull (1983), unemployed households
choose their search effort that determines their reemployment probability in the subsequent
period. There is a government that provides unemployment insurance and finances these
transfer payments through a consumption tax. Our main theoretical contribution is an
extension of Krebs’ tractability result to search models: the equilibrium allocation can
be found without knowledge of the underlying wealth distribution, which facilitates the
computation of equilibria substantially.
3Much of the theoretical literature on optimal unemployment insurance, e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979)
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), support the idea that falling benefit schedules are optimal. However,
recently Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008) challenge this result: the lower the wealth, the more easier
it is to provide search incentives and the higher the benefit payments can be without distorting incentives.
4On the one hand, this model builds on the extensive literature of human capital based endogenous
growth models, e.g. Lucas (1988) and Jones and Manuelli (1990), among many others and, on the other
hand, Krebs (2003, 2006) relates to the macroeconomic incomplete markets literature, e.g. ?, Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994). In particular, Aiyagari (1994) discusses a consumption saving model with
idiosyncratic shocks on labor income, that can be interpreted as employment shocks. However, he abstracts
from an explicit formulation of the labor market which makes his model inappropriate to discuss different
aspects of unemployment insurance systems.
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Using our theoretical characterization result, we proceed with the quantitative evaluation of
the labor market reforms in Germany. More specifically, we calibrate the model to match
the pre-2005 German data, and then obtain the quantitative effects of the recent labor
market reforms through model simulation. Our main quantitative results are as follows.
First, the 2005-reform had large employment effects: the equilibrium unemployment rate
has been reduced by approximately 1.1 percentage points from 7.5 to 6.4 percent. Second,
the drop in unemployment has led to substantial output gains. Third, employed and
short-term unemployed households have experienced a significant welfare gain. Hence, the
positive incentive effect dominates the negative insurance effect. However, the long-term
unemployed have lost in welfare terms. Fourth, a further decrease in the benefit rate leads
only to small additional welfare gains, if at all. Finally, the effects of the 2006-reform are
qualitatively similar, but quantitatively much smaller.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a short discussion of the related
literature in section 2.2, we develop the economic model in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is
devoted to the construction of a competitive equilibrium. In section 2.5, we calibrate
the model to match stylized facts of the German economy and simulate the respective
employment, growth, and welfare effects of the recent labor market reforms. Furthermore,
we investigate the robustness of our results with respect to the critical model parameters.
Section 2.6 presents our conclusions.
2.2 Related Literature
There is an extensive empirical literature on policy reform evaluation that analyzes the
effect of various labor market reforms on the unemployed using micro-level data.6 In a
certain sense, papers in this field also deal with the interaction of labor market reform
and labor market risk (long-term consequences of unemployment). However, work in this
literature usually does not take into account any effect of labor market reform on labor
demand and wages, which is arguably of first-order importance when the labor market
5In other words, the change in the eligibility period implemented in 2006 had only small effects on
re-employment probabilities. This result is consistent with the findings of recent empirical studies (see
Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) for Germany).
6For a discussion of this strand of the literature, see section 2.5, and in more detail, Franz (2009).
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reform affects a large number of workers. By contrast, some of the work in the applied
general equilibrium literature, e.g. Boehringer, Boeters, and Feil (2005) and Immervoll,
Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007), explicitly deals with such labor market effects of policy
reform, and some interesting applications of this approach to Germany have been done in
Franz, Guertzgen, Schubert, and Clauss (2007). However, this work has neither taken into
account income risk, nor considered the interaction of labor, capital, and goods markets –
two issues that will take center stage in our analysis.
The present model is most closely related to Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008) who
use a Bewley-type model with labor market search to analyze the optimal profile of the
unemployment insurance system. Similarly to our model, they succeed in characterizing
the equilibrium consumption-saving and reservation wage decision without solving for the
underlying wealth distribution.7 However, in Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008),
this result relies on CARA-utility specification, whereas our approach is valid as long as
preferences are homothetic and disposable income is linear homogenous in asset holdings.8
Our model is further related to Lentz (2009) who extends Aiyagari (1994) by a labor
market module with endogenous search effort decision. In contrast to our paper, his model
is not tractable in the above-mentioned sense because the consumption-saving and the
search effort decision depends on the individual wealth level such that the equilibrium
unemployment rate depends on the underlying wealth distribution. Thus, solving the
model comes at high computational costs. There are two further differences between the
above mentioned papers and our paper. First, we take a general equilibrium perspective.
As Lentz (2009) showed, the relation between the time preference rate and the interest
rate is crucial for the determination of welfare effects. Since the return is determined
endogenously in our model, we do not suffer from this additional degree of freedom. Second,
our framework is actually an endogenous growth model such that we can also analyze the
long-run growth effects of the labor market reforms in question.
Our paper further relates to the extensive research of optimal unemployment insurance,
starting with the influential contribution by Shavell and Weiss (1979), who explicitly ad-
7Specifically, the reservation wage decision is equivalent to our approach in which households choose
their search effort. However, in a model where households choose their reservation wage, the quantitative
results depend crucially on the non-observable wage offer distribution whereas the results in our model are
quite insensitive to the parameterization of the job search technology.
8See, e.g., Stokey (2009).
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dress the tradeoff between insurance and incentives in an asymmetric information frame-
work. In their framework, the government is assumed to be unable to observe the house-
holds’ search behavior and thus cannot condition benefit payments on search effort. In
contrast, benefit duration is observable and implementing a falling benefit profile over the
unemployment spell punishes in expectation the lazy job seekers more than the diligent
ones. Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) show that such an
unemployment insurance system is capable of dealing with insurance and incentives opti-
mally. In contrast, allowing for precautionary savings, Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007,
2008) challenge these results. These models on the optimal unemployment insurance are,
however, partial equilibrium models since they only consider the effect of the unemploy-
ment insurance schedule on a single unemployed agent abstracting from financing issues in
general equilibrium.
In order to model labor markets explicitly, the literature suggests two approaches: the
search theoretic approach and the matching function approach. The search theoretic ap-
proach assumes that households either receive wage offers that are randomly drawn from
a pre-specified distribution, e.g. McCall (1970), Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998), or that households endogenously decide on their search effort which
then determines their re-employment probability in the subsequent period, e.g. Benhabib
and Bull (1983) and Lentz (2009). The implementation of a more generous unemployment
insurance system leads either to an increase in the reservation wage or to a reduction of
the search effort, which makes these models an appropriate choice for analyzing the in-
centive effect of unemployment benefit payments. For tractability reasons, however, most
search theoretical models rely on risk-neutral agents, which makes them unsuitable for the
discussion of the insurance effect.
The matching function approach, based on Phelps (1968) and in particular Pissarides
(1979), exhibits in contrast to the search theoretic approach the advantage of a more de-
tailed description of the demand side of the economy.9 Like the search theoretic approach,
these models are often based on risk neutrality such that the insurance effect of unemploy-
ment benefit payments cannot be analyzed. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) combine
the matching model with the standard real business cycle model to analyze the shock
9For a detailed overview of the matching model approach, see Pissarides (2000).
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propagation mechanisms with sluggish labor adjustments. In contrast to our model, they
assume that households consist of many individual agents that are able to pool unemploy-
ment risk such that the provision of unemployment insurance is superfluous. Recently,
there are some papers that take the market incompleteness and thus the idiosyncracy of
employment shocks more seriously, e.g. Costain and Reiter (2005) and Nakajima (2010)
and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2009). Due to different employment histories, house-
holds are now heterogenous with respect to their asset holdings and current employment
state, which forces the authors to use involved and time-consuming numerical methods
in order to simulate the equilibria of the economy. The advantage of our approach, in
contrast, is the simple characterization of the equilibrium which allows more theoretical
insights and imposes only a low computational burden. Costain and Reiter (2005) and
Nakajima (2010) focus on the insurance effect of unemployment benefit payments, but
in the absence of endogenous search effort choices in their models, the provision of more
unemployment insurance does not discourage households from search. In other words, in
designing the unemployment insurance system, the government does not face the tradeoff
between offering insurance, on one side, and providing incentives, on the other. Launov and
Wa¨lde (2010) also present a tractable macro model with income risk and search/matching,
but they do not allow workers to save.
2.3 The Economy
2.3.1 Households
Consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, search model of the labor market with one non-
perishable all-purpose good that can be either consumed or invested. There is a continuum
of ex-ante identical, infinitely-lived households with unit mass. Let S = S1×S2 denote the
space of stochastic states, where s1it ∈ S1 is the current employment state of household i,
and s2it ∈ S2 denotes an i.i.d. depreciation shock to human capital.
Preferences are time-separable and each household derives utility from consumption cit
and disutility from search effort lit. By choosing the search intensity, unemployed agents
directly determine their next-period reemployment probability. The one-period utility
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function is separable in consumption and search. Specifically, assume
u(cit, lit) = ln cit − 1st=u d(lit)
where d(lit) denotes the disutility from search, satisfying d
′(lit) > 0 and d′′(lit) ≥ 0. The
indicator function 1x equals one when statement x is true and zero otherwise. Future
utility is discounted by the time discount factor β.
Let kit and hit denote the stocks of physical and human capital held by household i.
Employed households receive capital and labor income, rktkit and rhthit, with rkt and rht
denoting the (gross) return to physical and human capital, respectively. We assume that
the income net of depreciation of unemployed households is proportional to total asset
holdings. Specifically, income is given by bqt (kit + hit), where benefit entitlements can be
either high, q = h , or low, q = l . This assumption guarantees that the unemployed will
not shift resources from human capital to physical capital as a response to a change of
the benefit rate. This excludes output effects that are solely based on the unemployed’s
shift from unproductive human capital to productive physical capital. Furthermore, as we
will show, every household chooses the same portfolio of physical and human capital in
equilibrium. This excludes substantial negative human capital investment and thus allows
a straightforward interpretation of the benefit rate bqt as unemployment benefit.
10 The
households use their net income and their current wealth position to buy consumption,
which is taxed at rate τct, and next period physical and human capital stock.
Each household i chooses a complete contingent plan {cit, ki,t+1, hi,t+1, lit}∞t=0 in order to
maximize his lifetime utility. Specifically, the optimization problem reads
max
{cit,ki,t+1,hi,t+1,lit}∞t=0
{
U = ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt (ln cit − 1s1it=u d(lit))
]}
10There is also a different interpretation of the assumption that income of unemployed households is
given by bqt (kit + hit): The government pays unemployment benefits b˜
q
t hit and seizes a fraction ρ
q
t of
the unemployed’s physical capital income and uses this revenue as an additional source to finance the
unemployment benefit net depreciation. The unemployed’s capital income is thus taken into account when
determining the unemployment compensation. Total income net of depreciation of the unemployed is given
by ((1 − ρqt )rkt − δk) kit + (b˜qt − δh(s2it)) hit. For simplicity, we assume that the government sets b˜qt and
ρqt such that b˜
q
t − δh(s2it) = (1− ρqt )rkt − δk and define bqt = b˜qt − δh(s2it). The unemployed’s income thus
simplifies to bqt (kit + hit).
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subject to
(1 + τct) cit + ki,t+1 + hi,t+1 =
(1 + rkt − δk) kit + (1 + rht − δh(s2it)) hit, for s1it = e(1 + bqt ) (kit + hit), q ∈ {h , l } otherwise
ki,t+1 ≥ 0
hi,t+1 ≥ 0
where δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital and δh(s2it) denotes the stochastic
depreciation rate on human capital. For convenience, let the subscript of the expectation
operator indicate the space with respect to which we take the expectation.
We now discuss the space of stochastic states S (in contrast to the individual physical
and human capital holdings {kit, hit} ∈ R2+ that can be directly determined by households
in the previous period) and the underlying state transition probabilities in more detail.
Households are either employed, s1it = e, or unemployed. Unemployed agents are, on the
one hand, either good or bad job seekers {g , b}, and, on the other hand, either entitled
to high or low unemployment benefits {h , l }. Hence, we have to distinguish between four
different unemployment states: households with good search skills that are entitled to
high or low unemployment benefits, s1it = u
gh and s1it = u
gl , and households with bad
job search skills who can as well be entitled to either high or low unemployment benefits,
s1it = u
bh and s1it = u
bl . Taken together, the total space of employment states is given by
S1 = {e, ugh , ugl , ubh , ubl }.
The employment state transition is as follows: with probability σx, employed agents lose
their job, they become unemployed and are initially both, eligible for high unemployment
benefit and good job seekers. Unemployed agents exert search effort lit and they find a
new job in t + 1 with probability pij(e|ujh ; lit) respectively pij(e|ujl ; lit), for j ∈ {g , b}.
By definition, bad job seekers that exert the same search effort as the good ones will
nevertheless have a lower probability of reemployment. If, job search is not successful,
they will lose, if it has not already happened before, their entitlement to high benefits
with probability σbt and their good search skills with exogenously given probability σs.
Following Shimer and Werning (2006), we interpret the shock to the search technology as
depreciation of search skills. For example, search skills depreciate when households have
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finished searching for a job in the easily accessible proximity of their own social network
and now have to consider jobs outside their network. Note that while households take σbt
as exogenous to their optimization problem, the government chooses σbt as part of its labor
market policy. This specification of the state transition process implies that the longer the
unemployment spell, the higher the probability that households have lost their entitlement
to high benefit payments and the higher the probability that households have become bad
job seekers.
In addition to the employment state, there is a general independent and identical dis-
tributed depreciation shock s2it ∈ S2 on human capital. This shock is used to capture
earning volatility due to e.g. promotion or changes in the working conditions and only
happens to currently employed households. In contrast to the employment shock, this
depreciation shock constitutes a permanent income shock. With δ¯h denoting the deter-
ministic part of human capital depreciation, the total depreciation rate of human capital
reads
δh(s2it) = δ¯h + 1s1it=e s2it
Clearly, only the current employment state has predictive power for the state in the next
period: pi(si,t+1 | sit; lit) = pi(si,t+1 | s1it; lit).
2.3.2 Production
The production sector consists of a continuum of identical firms with neoclassical produc-
tion function that uses physical and human capital to produce the all-purpose good that
can be either consumed or invested. The production sector is competitive and can be
represented by an aggregate firm whose profit function reads
Π(Kt, H
e
t ) = F (Kt, H
e
t )− rkt Kt − rht Het
Kt denotes the aggregate amount of physical capital in the economy and H
e
t is the aggregate
amount of human capital used in the production sector.
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2.3.3 Government
The government pays out unemployment benefits EI [bqt (kit + hit) | s1it = uq], collects
consumption taxes, τctEI [cit], and seizes the unemployed’s capital income, rktEI [kit | s1it =
uq] for q ∈ {g , b} × {h , l }. We assume that the government runs a balanced budget in
every period. Thus, the government’s budget constraint reads
τct EI [cit] + rkt EI [kit | s1it = uq] = EI [bqt (kit + hit) | s1it = uq]
In addition to the consumption tax {τct}∞t=0 and the benefit rates {bht , blt}∞t=0, the govern-
ment also chooses the expected entitlement period to high benefit payments via {σbt}∞t=0,
which enters the government’s budget constraint through the expectation operator. From
now on, we restrict to stationary labor market policies in the sense that {bht , blt , σbt}∞t=0 =
(bh , bl , σb).
2.4 Equilibrium
In order to construct the equilibrium, we follow Krebs (2003) and transform the optimiza-
tion problem into a portfolio choice problem. We also define total wealth wit ≡ kit + hit
and the portfolio share of physical capital θit ≡ kitkit+hit . Equipped with these definitions,
the household’s budget constraint and the law of motion for physical and human capital
simplifies to
wi,t+1 =
(1 + θit (rkt − δk) + (1− θit) (rht − δh(s2it))) wit − (1 + τct) cit for s1it = e(1 + bq) wit − (1 + τct) cit, q ∈ {h , l } otherwise
The terms multiplying the current wealth position wit are the return to total wealth and
we define them as [1 + r(θit, sit; rkt, rht)] for convenience. For employed agents, this
return is the portfolio weighted net return to physical and human capital. In contrast,
unemployed agents just receive, at least from the perspective of households exogenous
return bq, q ∈ {h , l }. Clearly, the return to wealth for the employed households depends
on the individual portfolio choice, whereas the return for unemployed agents does not.
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With these definitions, the household’s budget constraint simplifies further to
wi,t+1 =
[
1 + r(θit, sit; rkt, rht)
]
wit − (1 + τct) cit (2.1)
Instead of {cit, xkit, xhit, lit}∞t=0, households now directly choose {cit, θi,t+1, wi,t+1, lit}∞t=0
subject to the flow budget constraint (2.1). A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium for Given Labor Market Policy).
A competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy (bh , bl , σb) is
1. a sequence {Kt, Het }∞t=0 that maximizes the firm’s profit for a given sequence of factor
prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0;
2. a sequence {cit, θi,t+1, wi,t+1, lit}∞t=0 that solves agent i’s maximization problem for
a given sequence of factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0, idiosyncratic shocks {sit}∞t=0 and con-
sumption tax rates {τct}∞t=0;
3. a sequence {rkt, rht}∞t=0 that satisfies market clearing on the input factor market,
EI [kit] = Kt and EI [hit | s1it = e] = Het ; and
4. a sequence of consumption tax rates that satisfies the balanced budget constraint of
the government {τct}∞t=0.
From now on, we focus on a stationary equilibrium as defined in the next proposition:
Definition 2.2 (Stationary Equilibrium).
A competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy is stationary if
1. the returns to physical and human capital are stationary, rkt = rk and rht = rh,
2. the tax policy is stationary, τct = τc, and
3. the flow into the different employment states is equal to the flow out of them.
Let us start with the firm’s optimization problem. Due to competitive markets, the usual
marginal product conditions for profit maximization apply. Define the aggregate capital-
to-labor ratio that is used in production K˜t =
Kt
Het
and define the production technology in
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intensive form f(K˜t) = F (K˜t, 1). The conditions for profit maximization in the stationary
equilibrium then read
rk = f
′(K˜t) (2.2)
rh = f(K˜t)− K˜t f ′(K˜t) (2.3)
Stationarity of the factor prices immediately reveals K˜t = K˜. Thus, the total investment
return can be more compactly written as r(θit, sit; rk, rh) = r(θit, sit; K˜).
We now consider the maximization problem of the households. The Bellman equation
associated with the household’s optimization problem is
V (θit, wit, sit)
= max
cit,θi,t+1,wi,t+1,lit
{
ln cit − 1s1it=u d(lit) + β ES
[
V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, si,t+1
]}
(2.4)
subject to the flow budget constraint (2.1). The first-order conditions with respect to
wi,t+1, θi,t+1 and lit are
1
cit
= β ES
[
1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; K˜)
ci,t+1
]
(2.5)
0 = ES
[
(rk − δk)− (rh − δh(s2i,t+1))
ci,t+1
]
(2.6)
d′(lit) = β
∂pij′(e|ujm; lit)
∂lit
ES2
[
V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = e, s2i,t+1)
−
∑
q∈{g ,b}×{h,l }
pi(s1i,t+1 = u
q | s1it; lit) V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = uq, s2i,t+1)
]
,
j ∈ {g , b},m ∈ {h , l } (2.7)
The Euler equation (2.5) has the usual interpretation that the household’s utility loss today
of investing one more unit of the consumption good is equal to the utility gain tomorrow
of doing so. The intra-temporal first-order condition (2.6) states that the household must
be indifferent between investing one more unit into physical capital and one more unit
into human capital. Finally, equation (2.7) requires that the utility loss today of searching
one more unit is equal to the expected utility gain tomorrow of doing so. Any plan
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{ct, wt+1, θt+1, lt+1}∞t=0 that solves the system of first-order conditions equations (2.5)
to (2.7), the budget constraint (2.1) and the corresponding transversality condition, is a
solution to the household’s constrained utility maximization problem.11 It is easy to verify
that the consumption and saving functions
cit =
1− β
1 + τc
(1 + r(θit, sit; K˜)) wit (2.8)
wi,t+1 = β (1 + r(θit, sit; K˜)) wit (2.9)
jointly solve the budget constraint (2.1) and the Euler equation (2.5). Using these policy
functions with the method of guess and verify, we can show that:
Proposition 2.1 (Lifetime Utility).
The value function V (θit, wit, sit) that solves the respective Bellman equation is given by
V (θit, wit, sit) =
1
1− β ln[(1 + r(θit, sit; K˜)) wit] +B(s1it) (2.10)
where B(s1it) solves the Bellman equation in intensive form
B(s1it) = max
θi,t+1,lit
{
ln
1− β
1 + τc
+
β
1− β ln β − 1s1it=u d(lit)
+ β ES
[
1
1− β ln(1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; K˜)) +B(s1i,t+1)
]}
(2.11)
Proof. See appendix.
Using the consumption policy (2.8), the first-order conditions with respect to θi,t+1 simplify
to
0 = ES2
[
(rk − δk)− (rh − δh(s2i,t+1))
1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; K˜)
]
(2.12)
Note that since the return to wealth for unemployed households does not depend on their
individual portfolio composition, the first-order condition with respect to the portfolio
choice, equation (2.12), is independent of the transition probabilities and thus, independent
11In proposition 2.1, we solve for the value function that is associated with the plan
{cit, wi,t+1, θit, lit}∞t=0. The value function is finite and thus, the transversality condition holds.
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of the current employment state s1it and the search effort lit. Moreover, this condition is
also independent of the current portfolio share and the household’s current wealth, leading
to the conclusion that every agent chooses the same portfolio, independent of his individual
shock history and wealth. This clearly defines a policy function θi,t+1 = θ(K˜).
The consumption policy (2.8) and the Bellman equation in intensive form (2.10) help to
transform the first-order condition with respect to the search effort decision into
v′(lit) = β
∂pij′(e|ujm; lit)
∂lit
ES2
[ (
ln(1 + r(θi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = e, K˜))
1− β +B(s1i,t+1 = e)
)
−
∑
q∈{g ,b}×{h,l }
pi(s1i,t+1 = u
q|s1it; lit)
(
ln(1 + r(θi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = u
q, K˜))
1− β +B(s1i,t+1 = u
q)
)]
,
j ∈ {g , b},m ∈ {h , l } (2.13)
Note that this condition is independent of wealth, the current portfolio and the current
realization of the i.i.d. depreciation shock s2it. Thus, conditional on the employment
status, s1it, every household chooses the same search intensity. This defines a function
lit = l(s1it = u
q; K˜), for q = {n , s} × {h , l }. Our result is closely related to Shimer and
Werning (2008) who consider a partial equilibrium consumption savings model in which
unemployed households choose their reservation wages. Under CARA-preferences, they
show that the choice of the reservation wage (which is equivalent to the search effort choice
in our model) is wealth-independent with strong implications for the optimal unemploy-
ment benefit scheme. The wealth independence in our model, however, is based on the
combination of more general homothetic preferences and disposable income which is linear
homogenous in the agent’s asset holdings. Market clearing on the input factor market
requires that the households’ supply of physical and human capital is consistent with the
firm’s demand for the two input factors. Thus, market clearing satisfies
K˜ =
EI [(1− θ(s1it; K˜)) wit | s1it = e]
EI [θ(s1it; K˜) wit]
(2.14)
Although in equilibrium aggregate wealth grows infinitely at a constant rate, the wealth
of type s1t households relative to aggregate wealth is constant. Hence, as will be shown
in the appendix, the market clearing condition (2.14) depends on the wealth ratios but is
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independent of the absolute wealth level.
Finally, using the households’ policy functions and market clearing, it is easy to verify that
the government’s budget constraint is independent of the absolute wealth level. Moreover,
since the policy functions for saving, portfolio choices and search decisions, as well as the
market clearing condition, are independent of the consumption tax rate, it is trivial to
choose the consumption tax rate τc such that the government budget is satisfied. In par-
ticular, the choice of the consumption tax rate does not distort the equilibrium allocations.
The previous discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2 (Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium).
A stationary competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy, (bh , bl , σb), is charac-
terized by
1. The firms’ problem satisfies the usual marginal product conditions, equations (2.2)
and (2.3).
2. The households’ consumption and saving policies are linear homogenous in wealth
and given by equations (2.8) and (2.9). Conditional on the employment state, every
agent chooses the same wealth independent portfolio and search effort decision. In
particular, the portfolio choice and search effort decision jointly solve equations (2.12)
and (2.13).
3. Market clearing satisfies (2.14) and is independent of the absolute wealth level in the
economy.
4. The consumption tax rate does not distort the above characterized equilibrium and
solves the government’s budget constraint.
Observe that despite the ex-post heterogeneity, which makes solutions to dynamic general
equilibrium models very complicated and time-consuming, we found a very simple solution
within our framework, .in which the equilibrium allocation can be characterized without
solving for the complete underlying wealth distribution.
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis
2.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model economy such that the equilibrium is consistent with quarterly
German data of the pre-reform period. The pre-2005 system was characterized by a rather
long period of Unemployment Benefit entitlements and an essentially unlimited means-
tested Unemployment Assistance after the eligibility to Unemployment Benefit entitle-
ments expired. Unemployment Benefit was between 60 and 67 percent of the previous net
income whereas Unemployment Assistance laylaid between 53 and 57 percent of previous
net income.12 If benefit payments were below the minimum level of subsistency, Social
Assistance was used to meet the additional need. Taking this into account, the OECD
(2006) calculates effective average net replacement rates of about 69 percent for both,
Unemployment Benefit and Unemployment Assistance. Hence, the two-tiered unemploy-
ment insurance system was effectively a one-tiered system. Based on Schmitz and Steiner
(2007), we calculate an average eligibility period for high benefit payments of 19.3 months
which translates into σb = 0.1554.
13 This accomplishes the calibration of the government’s
pre-reform policy parameters.
Having already calibrated σb, we now focus on the determination of the remaining state
transition rates: Since our setup abstracts from non-participation in the labor market,
we have to adjust the employment-to-unemployment flows by the employment-to-non-
participation flows. However, the employment-to-non-participation flows also include old
households who decide to retire early, young households who return to school in order to
accomplish their formal education and women who decide to take a maternity leave. These
cases cannot be counted as job loss in a narrow sense, and if we would include them, our
job loss rate would be upward biased. To avoid these issues, we only take the transition
rates from employment to unemployment and from employment to non-participation of
25 to 55 year old males as the job loss rate. Using the calculations by Bachmann (2005)
both rates add up to approximately one percent per month which yields σx = 0.03 per
quarter. Jung and Kuhn (2010) find transition rates in the same range. For simplicity,
12See for example Schmitz and Steiner (2007).
13In particular, we assume a uniform distribution of households aged between 25 and 64 years and
calculate the average (maximal) entitlement period for this age group.
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Table 2.1: Calibration - Exogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
A parameter of disutility of search 25
production
α capital share 0.3600
depreciation and depreciation shocks
δk depreciation rate: physical capital 0.0150
δh depreciation rate: human capital if employed 0.0150
µs2t expectation of i.i.d. shock 0
σs2t standard deviation of i.i.d. shock 0.1500
labor market and transition rates
bh unemployment benefit rate: high entitlement 0.6900
bl unemployment benefit rate: low entitlement 0.6900
σx job separation probability 0.0300
σb probability of loosing high benefit 0.1554
σs arrival rate of search technology shock 0.2500
we associate the search skill depreciation shock with long-term unemployment, which is
usually defined as an unemployment spell of at least one year. This yields a probability of
losing job search skills of σs = 0.25. For the job search technology, we follow Lentz (2009)
and use an exponential specification
pij(e | s1it; lit) = 1− e−λj lit , for j ∈ {g , b}
where λg > λb . The search technology parameters are determined such that the equilib-
rium unemployment rate is 7.5 percent and the equilibrium share of long-term unemployed
households to total unemployed households is 42 percent. The calibration values of the
search technology parameters depend on the equilibrium search effort which in turn de-
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pends on the specification of the disutility search.
The preference parameters are calibrated as follows: As in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)
or Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008), disutility of search is linear in search effort
d(lit) = A lit + ω
where ω denotes a fixed disutility of being unemployed. In equilibrium, the parameter
A is not separately identified from the parameters of the search technology λg and λb .
Consequently, there is one degree of freedom such that we can set the scaling parameter
to a numerically convenient value of A = 25. This implies λg = 7.2606 and λb = 2.9999
in order to make the equilibrium match our calibration targets. The fixed disutility of
being unemployed, ω, is calibrated to match the point elasticity of the job finding rate
with respect to benefit payments. Empirically, this elasticity is hard to pin down, because
the data sets either do not include the required information to construct a precise measure
of benefit payments (IAB data), or there are too few observations to get reliable results
(GSOEP). Addison, Centeno, and Portugal (2010) use a structural search model and the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to estimate the elasticity for several Eu-
ropean countries, and for Germany they find values between ηθ,b = −1.66 and ηθ,b = −1.14.
For the US, Meyer and Mok (2007) use a quasi-experimental setup in which the maximum
weekly benefit payments in New York State were raised. Their approach allows for the
construction of different control groups of households leading to substantial variation in
the data to get reliable results.14 They find that for the US, increasing the benefit rate
by 1 percent leads to an increase in benefit duration by 0.21 percent, and translating this
number into an elasticity of the reemployment probability with respect to benefit payments
yields approximately ηθ,b = −0.2. Clearly, the benefit level in the US is much lower than in
Germany, which implies that the elasticity in Germany has to be higher in absolute terms.
However, Addison, Centeno, and Portugal (2010) also estimate the respective elasticity for
the UK, which has labor market institutions comparable to the US. For the UK, they find
elasticities between ηθ,b = −0.62 and ηθ,b = −0.36, in absolute terms higher that the esti-
14In particular, households can be separated into three groups: i.) those who are not affected by this
policy since they were not eligible to the maximum weekly benefit payments under the old regime, ii.)
those who are partially affected in the sense that their new weekly benefit payments lie between the old
and the new maximum weekly benefit level and iii.) those who are now eligible for the maximum benefit
level under the new regime.
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mates by Meyer and Mok (2007) for the US, indicating that the estimates for Germany are
upward biased, in absolute terms. For this reason, we take the lower bound, ηθ,b = −1.14
for the benchmark calibration, yielding ω = 0.2668. Since the elasticity has a key role in
determining the effect of the labor market reforms on the aggregate unemployment rate,
we will run a sensitivity analysis for lower elasticities as well. Finally, the time-discount
factor β is set such that the aggregate private saving rate in equilibrium is 20 percent.
This yields β = 0.9799.
Table 2.2: Calibration - Endogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
β time preferences 0.9799
ω disutility of being unemployed 0.2668
production
z productivity 0.0794
labor market and transition rates
λg search technology parameter: good job seeker 7.2606
λb search technology parameter: bad job seeker 2.9999
parameters are chosen to match
aggregate saving rate 0.2000
aggregate quarterly consumption growth rate 0.0051
unemployment rate 0.0750
share of long-term unemployment 0.42
average benefit elasticity of reemployment probability −1.1400
We calibrate the depreciation rates to δk = δh = 0.015, which is approximately six percent
per annum. For physical capital, this value lies within the range suggested by the litera-
ture. For human capital, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) find annual depreciation
rates between zero and four percent. Accounting for the infinite horizon structure in our
model, we have to add an additional depreciation of two percent. Thus, a human capi-
26 CHAPTER 2. EVALUATION OF LABOR MARKET REFORMS
tal depreciation rate of six percent corresponds to an upper bound of reasonable values
suggested in the literature. The i.i.d. depreciation shock to human capital is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σs2t = 0.15, which, together with the
employment shocks and loss of job specific skills, implies a standard deviation of labor
income in equilibrium that is in line with micro-evidence for Germany, estimated by Krebs
and Yao (2010).
Finally, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas
F (Kt, H
e
t ) = z
(
Kt
)α (
Het
)1−α
with the capital share of output set to α = 0.36. The scaling parameter of the production
technology is chosen such that the annual equilibrium growth rate of aggregate consumption
is two percent. This gives z = 0.0794.
2.5.2 Growth and Welfare Effect of German Labor Market Re-
form
The first reform, which was implemented in January 2005, replaced the Unemployment
Assistance with Unemployment Benefit II, which requires tighter means tests and is inde-
pendent of previous earnings.15 Mapping this new system into our model (where unem-
ployment benefits depend on the stock of human capital), average benefit payments in the
second tier decrease substantially to about 45 percent of previous net earnings. The reg-
ulations of the second reform became binding in February 2006. The eligibility period for
Unemployment Benefit I 16 was reduced for all unemployed households, and a particularly
strong reduction was implemented for older unemployed agents. Based on Schmitz and
Steiner (2007) we calculate that the average eligibility period dropped from 19.3 to 13.5
months, thus σb increases from 0.1554 to 0.2222.
The macroeconomic effects of both reforms are given in table 2.3. The main findings
15In fact, by the introduction of Unemployment Benefit II, Unemployment Assistance and Social As-
sistance were merged.
16The pre-reform Unemployment Benefit was relabeled as Unemployment Benefit I, in order to make
the distinction between the newly introduced Unemployment Benefit II.
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Table 2.3: Macroeconomic Effects of the Labor Market Reforms
benchmark reform 1 reform 2
unemployment rate 7.50% 6.38% 6.25%
share of long-term unemployment 42.0% 32.8% 31.7%
annualized growth rate 2.00% 2.06% 2.08%
level effect on consumption1 0.00% 0.96% 1.12%
consumption tax rate 3.66% 2.69% 2.54%
capital-to-labor ratio 0.6950 0.6943 0.6927
1 Deviation form benchmark in percent.
are as follows: first, implementing the 2005-reform leads to a substantial decrease in the
equilibrium unemployment rate from 7.5 to 6.4 percent. Clearly, unemployed households
in the second tier, that means those who already lost their entitlement to high benefit
payments, increase their search effort in order to escape the state with low benefits more
quickly. Furthermore, for unemployed households who are still eligible for high benefit
payments, losing their entitlement becomes more threatening now, wherefore they increase
their search effort, as well. Decomposing the contribution of both mechanisms to the
decrease in the unemployment rate reveals that 57 percent of the decrease is due to the
reaction of the households who directly lost their entitlement to high benefit payments.
The remaining 43 percent are explained by search effort adjustments due to the increasing
threat of loosing high entitlements in the near future. The adjustments of the individual
search effort decisions to the labor market reforms are given in table 2.4.
When the eligibility period is reduced according to the second reform, those households
who still enjoy the high benefit rate will intensify their job search to avoid losing their enti-
tlements to high benefit payments. However, in order of magnitude, this effect is not very
important, and the unemployment rate decreases by 0.13 percentage points with respect
to the first reform. Put differently, the search effort decision and thus the re-employment
probability is quite insensitive to the duration of high benefit entitlements. This finding
is consistent with recent empirical research, e.g. by Caliendo, Tatsiramos, and Uhlendorff
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(2009) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007). In particular, Caliendo, Tatsiramos, and Uh-
lendorff (2009) find that the reemployment probability peaks only for those households
who are close to the exhaustion period of high benefit entitlements. Thus, if we reduce
the eligibility period, only the households who become close to the new exhaustion period
will raise their search effort, whereas the other households’ search effort decision is almost
unaffected. Our model, however, abstracts from the exhaustion period effect, since every
unemployed household with high entitlements faces the same expected period of remaining
entitled to high benefits, 1
σb
quarters. Thus, no unemployed agent is close to the exhaustion
period, making the adjustment of search effort negligible, and the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is hardly affected by the implementation of the second reform. Since we abstract
from the exhaustion period effect, our results for the second reform have to be interpreted
more cautiously as a lower bound.
Table 2.4: Household Policies
benchmark reform 1 reform 2
θ 0.3916 0.3941 0.3943
pin(l(ugh)) 0.5172 0.5379 0.5427
pin(l(ugl )) 0.5172 0.5672 0.5670
pis(l(ubh)) 0.1667 0.2137 0.2233
pis(l(ubl )) 0.1667 0.2618 0.2616
Second, the average consumption growth rate increases by 0.06 and 0.08 percentage points
on an annual basis for reform one and reform two, respectively. For the average consump-
tion growth rate, there are two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, human capital
risk increases and discourages households to accumulate human capital, which leads to a
downward pressure on the aggregate consumption growth rate. On the other hand, there
are more employed households in the new equilibrium who accumulate human capital at
higher rates than unemployed households. This leads to an upward pressure on the aggre-
gate consumption growth rate. In our numerical example, the second effect dominates the
first one. In a similar vein, we find that the equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio is almost
unaffected by the labor market reforms since there are two opposing forces at work. Dis-
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couraging human capital investment obviously raises K˜ while the employment effect tends
to raise the absolute amount of human capital used in production such that K˜ decreases.
Numerically, both effects almost offset each other.
Third, the increase in average consumption growth is accompanied by a considerable level
effect on equilibrium consumption. In particular, the decreasing unemployment rate leads
to an increase in production which finally allows an upward shift of the consumption path
by 0.96 and 1.12 percent for reform 1 and 2, respectively. From a different point of view,
we see that the reduction of the marginal benefit rate in the second tier, reform one, the
reduction of the eligibility period to high benefit payments in the first tier, reform two,
and the decrease in the total unemployment rate substantially reduce the total amount
of benefit payments. Hence, the government needs less tax revenue in order to meet its
balanced budget constraint, wherefore it reduces the consumption tax rate from 3.66 to
2.69 and 2.54 percent for labor market reforms one and two, respectively. Clearly, reducing
the cost of consumption heaves the consumption path to a higher level.
Table 2.5: Welfare Effect of Labor Market Reforms
reform 1 reform 2
welfare level insurance welfare level insurance
∆ 0.41% 1.93% −1.52% 0.45% 2.02% −1.57%
∆|s1t = e 0.48% 1.93% −1.45% 0.52% 2.02% −1.50%
∆|s1t = ugh 0.17% 1.93% −1.76% 0.18% 2.02% −1.84%
∆|s1t = ugl −0.32% 1.93% −2.15% −0.27% 2.02% −2.29%
∆|s1t = ubh −0.53% 1.93% −2.46% −0.63% 2.02% −2.65%
∆|s1t = ubl −1.70% 1.93% −3.63% −1.65% 2.02% −3.67%
Considering social welfare, which we define as the equally weighted average of the house-
holds’ lifetime utility, there are again two opposing forces at work when we implement the
labor market reforms. On the one hand, households enjoy a tax cut which allows them to
consume more in each period and, thus, raises their lifetime utility. On the other hand,
reducing benefit payments and shortening the entitlement period to high benefit payments
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increase the individual income risk which leads to losses of lifetime utility when households
are risk averse. In order to quantify the welfare effects, we follow Lucas (1987) and ask the
households in the pre-reform state how much additional consumption do they need in each
period in order to be indifferent between implementing the reform or not. Specifically, let
∆ denote the respective percentage share satisfying
ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt ln((1 + ∆) ct)
]
= ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt ln creft
]
where {ct}∞t=0 denotes the households’ consumption plans without labor market reforms
and {creft }∞t=0 are the consumption plans when the reform is implemented in period 0. In
table 2.5, we report the welfare effects17 and find substantial welfare gains of 0.41 and
0.45 for reform 1 and reform 2, respectively. Hence, the welfare improving level effect
of consumption dominates the welfare reducing effect from losing insurance. Clearly, the
currently employed households benefit most from the labor market reforms since the loss of
insurance imposes only second order risk on them in the sense that they first have to become
unemployed before being directly exposed to the risk of losing the high entitlements. More
surprisingly, those unemployed agents who receive the high benefit payments and are good
job seekers realize a slightly positive welfare gain from the labor market reforms. Hence,
for them, it still holds that the level effect of a higher consumption path dominates the
loss of insurance. For the other types of unemployed agents, however, the loss of insurance
dominates, leading to substantial welfare losses. Table 2.5 also reports the decomposition
of the welfare effect into level and insurance effect. Further reductions in the benefit rate,
however lead only to negligible additional welfare gains, if at all.
Clearly, the reaction of the equilibrium unemployment rate to the labor market reforms
depends crucially on the elasticity of the job finding probability with respect to the ben-
efit rate. The more elastic the job finding probability, the stronger the decrease in the
unemployment rate which finally leads to a stronger increase in aggregate production and
social welfare. In other words, the more elastic the job finding probability, the stronger
the level effect of consumption on social welfare. To assess the importance of this elasticity
with respect to our results, we recalibrate the model to a target elasticity of ηpi,b = −1.0
17For the computation of the welfare effects, we take the transition phase into account. Details on the
computation are deferred to the appendix.
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 31
Table 2.6: Macroeconomic Effects of the Labor Market Reform 1 - Different Target Elas-
ticities
benchmark ηpi,b = −1.14 ηpi,b = −1 ηpi,b = −0.5
unemployment rate 7.50% 6.38% 6.46% 6.82%
share of long-term unem-
ployment
42.0% 32.8% 33.5% 36.6%
annualized growth rate 2.00% 2.06% 2.05% 2.03%
level effect on consumption1 0.00% 0.96% 0.93% 0.83%
consumption tax rate 3.66% 2.69% 2.72% 2.81%
capital-to-labor ratio 0.6950 0.6943 0.6944 0.6946
1 Deviation form benchmark in percent.
and ηpi,b = −0.5 which is already in the range of values estimated for the United Kingdom
and thus, a lower bound (in absolute terms) for our analysis. Since the second reform
has only negligible effects, we focus on the first reform only. The macroeconomic effects
of the re-calibrated model are given in table 2.6. As expected, the more inelastic the job
finding probability with respect to benefit payments, the higher the unemployment rate:
setting the elasticity to −1.0 yields an equilibrium unemployment rate of 6.5 percent and
for an elasticity of −0.5, the unemployment only decreases to 6.8 percent. The smaller
employment effect on aggregate output finally translates into lower welfare effects that are
given in table 2.7.
2.6 Conclusions
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with labor market search and
incomplete markets which remains despite ex-post heterogenous agents tractable in the
sense that the equilibrium can be characterized without knowing the underlying wealth
distribution. The model allows the analysis of the unemployment insurance’s major tradeoff
between insuring households against earning and consumption volatility and providing an
incentive to exert search effort. In contrast to the existing literature, our model also
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Table 2.7: Welfare Effect of Labor Market Reform 1 - Different Target Elasticities
ηpi,b = −1.14 ηpi,b = −1.0 ηpi,b = −0.5
∆ 0.41% 0.38% 0.23%
∆|s1t = e 0.48% 0.45% 0.31%
∆|s1t = ugh 0.17% 0.14% −0.03%
∆|s1t = ugl −0.32% −0.36% −0.55%
∆|s1t = ubh −0.53% −0.59% −0.84%
∆|s1t = ubl −1.70% −1.77% −2.10%
considers long-run growth effect of the unemployment insurance system.
Applying the model to evaluate the welfare and growth effects of the recent labor market
reforms in Germany, we find that society as a whole benefits from these reforms and,
furthermore, even short-term unemployed benefit since the loss of insurance is dominated
by the employment effect. The results remain quite robust throughout variations of the
critical calibration target, the elasticity of the job finding rate with respect to the benefit
level. Although this reform yields substantial welfare gains, a further decrease in the benefit
rate in the second tier only causes negligible additional welfare gains. In other words, at
this point, the social welfare function is already quite flat in the space of benefit rates.
Further research is devoted to the analytical derivation of optimal unemployment schedules
with explicit focus on the equilibrium growth effects of those reforms. The analysis of opti-
mal unemployment insurance is feasible due to the straightforward simple characterization
of the stationary equilibrium in our model.
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2.A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2.1
In order to find the value function, we apply the method of guess and verify. For con-
venience, we suppress the dependency of the coefficients and the return functions on the
aggregate state K˜. In particular, guess
V (θit, wit, sit) = A(s1it) ln[(1 + r(θit, sit)) wit] +B(s1it) (2.15)
Together with the optimal consumption policy, the Bellman equation (2.4) reads
A(s1it) ln[(1 + r(θit, sit)) wit] +B(s1it) = max
θi,t+1,lit
{
ln
1− β
1 + τc
+ ln[(1 + r(θit, sit)) wit]
− 1s1it=u d(lit) + β ES
[
A(s1i,t+1) ln[(1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1)) wi,t+1] +B(s1i,t+1)
]}
Combining the optimal consumption policy and the budget constraint yields wi,t+1 =
β (1 + r(θit, sit)) wit. Thus
A(s1it) ln[(1 + r(θit, sit)) wit] +B(s1it)
= max
θi,t+1,lit
{
(1 + β ES[A(s1i,t+1)]) ln[(1 + r(θit, sit)) wit] + ln
1− β
1 + τc
+β ES[A(s1i,t+1)] ln β−1s1it=u d(lit)+β ES
[
A(s1i,t+1) ln(1+r(θi,t+1, si,t+1))+B(s1i,t+1)
]}
Now suppose, we already found a solution for θi,t+1 and lit that are independent of current
state variables θit, wit and s2it. Then, the method of undetermined coefficients gives
A(s1it) =
1
1− β
and the Bellman equation then simplifies to
B(s1it) = max
θi,t+1,lit
{
ln
1− β
1 + τc
+
β
1− β ln β − 1s1it=u d(lit)
+ β ES
[
1
1− β ln(1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1)) +B(s1i,t+1)
]}
(2.16)
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Obviously, the optimal portfolio choice as well as the optimal search intensity that solve the
Bellman equation in intensive form, equation (2.16) are independent of the current state
variables θit, wit and s2it. To put it differently: θi,t+1 and lit only depend on s1it and s3it and
the exogenous model parameters, which is consistent with our previous conjecture. The
optimal policies transform the functional equation (2.16) into the respective plan equation
such that we can easily solve for B(s1), thereby verifying our initial guess on the functional
form of the value function, equation (2.15). This completes our proof.
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2.B Appendix: Market Clearing Condition
Let st = (st, st−1, st−2, . . . ) denote the history of shocks, which describes the history of
type-st-agent. Total wealth in the economy at t+ 1 is defined as
Wt+1 =
∑
st
wt+1(s
t) pi(st) (2.17)
The aggregate wealth of those people with (st, st−1) reads
Wt+1(st, st−1) = pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2
wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2) (2.18)
and their share of total wealth is defined as
ρt+1(st, st−1) =
Wt+1(st, st−1)
Wt+1
=
pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)∑
st wt+1(s
t) pi(st)
=
∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)∑
st wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1)
pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
=
Wt
Wt+1
pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
(2.19)
where we suppressed the dependency of the conditional probabilities from individual search
effort decisions, for convenience.
We are now interested in how the wealth shares ρt+1(st, st−1) evolve over time. By the
optimal consumption policy (2.8), we know that the law of motion of wealth in equilibrium
is governed by wi,t+1 = β [1+r(θit(si,t−1), sit; K˜t)] wit. Using this condition, together with
our Markov process that governs the evolution of the state, we can rewrite the definition
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of total wealth, equation (2.17), as follows:
Wt+1 =
∑
st
wt+1(s
t) pi(st) =
∑
st
∑
st−1
wt+1(st, s
t−1) pi(st | st−1) pi(st−1)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] wt(st−1) pi(st | st−1) pi(st−1)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
∑
st−2
∑
st−3
β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] wt(st−1)
× pi(st | st−1) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2 | st−3) pi(st−3)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] pi(st | st−1)
×
[∑
st−2
pi(st−1 | st−2)
∑
st−3
wt(s
t−1) pi(st−2 | st−3) pi(st−3)
]
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2
ρ(st−1, st−2) Wt
Hence,
Wt
Wt+1
=
1∑
st
∑
st−1 β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 ρ(st−1, st−2)
(2.20)
In addition,
pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
= pi(st | st−1) β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)]
∑
st−2 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
= pi(st | st−1) β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)]
×
∑
st−2
∑
st−3 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2 | st−3)pi(st−3)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
= pi(st | st−1) β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)]
×
∑
st−2
∑
st−3 pi(st−1 | st−2) wt(st−1) pi(st−2 | st−3)pi(st−3)∑
st−1 wt(s
t−1) pi(st−1)
= pi(st | st−1) β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)]
∑
st−2
ρt(st−1, st−2) (2.21)
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Using (2.20) and (2.21) in (2.19) yields the following law of motion for the wealth share:
ρt+1(st, st−1)
=
pi(st | st−1) β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)]
∑
st−2 ρt(st−1, st−2)∑
st
∑
st−1 β [1 + r(θt(st−1), st; K˜t)] pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2 ρt(st−1, st−2)
(2.22)
Now, consider the aggregate stock of physical and human capital used in production. By
definition, the stock of physical capital used in production reads
Kt+1 =
∑
st
kt+1(s
t) pi(st) =
∑
st
θt+1(st) wt+1(s
t) pi(st) =
∑
st
θt+1(s
t) wt+1(s
t) pi(st)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
∑
st−2
θt+1(st) wt+1(s
t) pi(st | st−1) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
θt+1(st) pi(st | st−1)
∑
st−2
wt+1(s
t) pi(st−1 | st−2) pi(st−2)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
θt+1(st) Wt+1(st, st−1)
=
∑
st
∑
st−1
θt+1(st) ρt+1(st, st−1) Wt+1 (2.23)
For the stock of human capital that is used in production, only those agents that are
currently employed, are relevant. Hence,
Het+1 =
∑
st
pi(s1,t+1 = e | st) [1− θt+1(st)] wt+1(st) pi(st)
which simplifies, by the similar procedure as above, to
Het+1 =
∑
st
∑
st−1
pi(s1,t+1 = e | st) [1− θt+1(st)] ρt+1(st, st−1) Wt+1 (2.24)
By (2.23) and (2.24), the capital-to-labor ratio reads
K˜t+1 =
∑
st
∑
st−1 θt+1(st) ρt+1(st, st−1)∑
st
∑
st−1 pi(st+1 = e | st) [1− θt+1(st)] ρt+1(st, st−1)
(2.25)
Clearly, stationarity of the equilibrium implies ρt = ρ, ∀t. Thus, every K˜ that solves this
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condition (note that the ratios ρ defined previously, depend on the capital to labor ratio
via the return functions) implicitly solves market clearing on the input factor markets.
Observe, market clearing is independent of aggregate wealth.
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2.C Appendix: Welfare Effects
In this appendix, we show the details on how to compute the welfare effects in our model
with transition dynamics.
Step 1: Calculate the stationary equilibrium before and after the implementation of the
reform. In particular, calculate the respective portfolio choices and search intensities, the
aggregate capital-to-labor ratios and the wealth shares ρt(st−1, st−2). Suppose we imple-
ment the labor market reform in t = 0 and the new stationary equilibrium is reached in
t = T . Then, the respective lifetime utilities read
V (θi0, wi0, si0) =
[
1
1− β ln(1 + r(θi0, si0; K˜)) +B(s1i0, s3i0)
]
+
1
1− β ln wi0
V (θiT , wiT , siT ) =
[
1
1− β ln(1 + r(θiT , siT ; K˜)) +B(s1iT , s3iT )
]
+
1
1− β ln wiT
Observe that the social planner cannot simply aggregate the lifetime utilities in t = 0
and t = T and compare them, because the equilibrium distribution of agents and the
wealth distribution is different in t = 0 and t = T . Nevertheless, as we will show below,
it is sufficient to compute the term in square brackets, which is perfectly feasible, and for
convenience, we define
V˜iT =
1
1− β ln(1 + r(θiT , siT ; K˜)) +B(s1iT , s3iT )
such that
V (θiT , wiT , siT ) = V˜iT +
1
1− β ln wiT
Step 2: Fix T . Since in our model, the transition from the old to the new stationary
equilibrium is very fast, it suffices to set T = 25.
Step 3: Guess a sequence of wealth shares {ρt(st−1, st−2)}Tt=0.
Step 4: Since t = T is already the new equilibrium, we know θiT (si,T−1) and hence, li,T−1.
In other words, we know the household decisions made in period T − 1. Thus, we can
immediately consider the household decision in period T − 2. The respective Bellman
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equation reads
V (θi,T−2, wi,T−2, si,T−2)
= max
{
ln ci,T−2 − 1s1i,T−2=u d(li,T−2) + β E
[
ln ci,T−1 − 1s1i,T−1=u d(li,T−1)
+ β
(
V˜iT +
1
1− β lnwiT
)]}
= max
{
ln ci,T−2 − 1s1i,T−2=u d(li,T−2)
+ β E
[
ln
1− β
1 + τc,T−1
[1 + r(θi,T−1, si,T−1; K˜i,T−1)]wi,T−1 − 1s1i,T−1=u d(li,T−1)
+ β
(
E[V˜iT ] +
1
1− β ln β[1 + r(θi,T−1, si,T−1; K˜i,T−1)]wi,T−1
)]}
Where the last line follows from the optimal consumption policy and its implied law of
motion for individual wealth holdings. For given wealth shares in period T − 1, we can
simultaneously solve for the optimal policies in T−2 and the capital-to-labor ratio in T−1.
Note that the optimal policies are wealth independent, even during the transition phase.
With these results, we compute
V˜T−1 = ln
1− β
1 + τc,T−1
[1 + r(θi,T−1, si,T−1; K˜i,T−1)]− 1s1i,T−1=u d(li,T−1)
+ β
(
E[V˜iT ] +
1
1− β ln β[1 + r(θi,T−1, si,T−1; K˜i,T−1)]
)
and thus
V (θi,T−1, wi,T−1, si,T−1) = V˜i,T−1 +
1
1− β ln wi,T−1 (2.26)
Repeat this backward solving algorithm until t = 0.
Step 5: Use the optimal policies in step 4 to calculate the implied wealth shares, solving
forward from t = 0 to t = T .
Step 6: If the wealth shares of the guess and the forward calculated wealth shares of step
5 are close enough, go to step 7. Otherwise, update your guess on the initial sequence of
wealth shares and go back to step 4.
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Step 7: In order to compute the welfare effect for households with initial state (θi0, wi0, si0),
we ask the households in the pre-reform state how much additional consumption do they
need in each period in order to be indifferent between implementing the reform or not.
Specifically, let ∆(s0) denote the respective percentage share. V (·) and V ref (·) respec-
tively denote the lifetime utility without and with labor market reform. Then
1
1− β ln(1 + ∆(s0)) + V (θi0, wi0, si0) = V
ref (θi0, wi0, si0)
Solving for ∆ yields the welfare effect for households with current state sit:
∆(s0) = e
(1−β) (V ref (θi0, wi0, si0)−V (θi0, wi0, si0))
Note that by (2.26), we know that wi0 cancels out such that the welfare effects are in-
dependent of the wealth level and the wealth distribution. Finally, having calculated the
welfare effects ∆(s0) for all s0, the social welfare is the weighted average over ∆(s0) with
the shares of s0 in the population as weights.
18
18Alternatively, we could also first compute the social welfare and afterwards the welfare effects. How-
ever, since most people belong to one type, the employed, the results are fairly equivalent.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Unemployment Insurance in
General Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
The empirical literature documents a substantial degree of labor income risk, with a large
fraction actually caused by (un)employment risk.1 The existing (un)employment risk points
to inherently missing insurance markets due to informational frictions. Specifically, if the
job seekers’ effort choices are not publicly observable, benefit payments cannot be made
contingent on the job search decision, and the existing moral hazard friction leads to a
collapse of private unemployment insurance markets.2 In designing the unemployment
insurance system, the government has to weigh labor income insurance insurance against
distorting the search incentives.3
In this paper, we use a dynamic general equilibrium search model of the labor market to
compute an optimal unemployment insurance scheme when search effort choices are only
1For the United States, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) estimate a standard deviation of the log of labor income for between
0.15 and 0.20. Furthermore, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) find that the long run earning loss
upon job displacement is around 25 percent. Although Farber (2003) only finds losses half as large, it
is undeniable, that job displacement and the associated unemployment spell substantially contribute to
labor income risk. For a more detailed discussion, see Kletzer (1998).
2Arrow (1963) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have already made this point in different contexts.
3For an analysis of the trade-off between insurance and distorted incentives, see, e.g., Shavell and Weiss
(1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008), and Pavoni (2007).
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private information of the households. In contrast to the existing literature on optimal
unemployment insurance, we first provide a macroeconomic (general equilibrium) perspec-
tive, second allow for precautionary saving, and third preserve the analytical tractability in
the sense that the optimal unemployment insurance system can be characterized without
solving for the complete underlying wealth distribution. The first property is motivated
by Lentz (2009) who find that the welfare effects in his labor market search model sub-
stantially depend on the relation between the time discount factor and the interest rate.
In general equilibrium, the interest rate is endogenously determined such that we get rid
of this additional degree of freedom. The second property is motivated by Shimer and
Werning (2006, 2007, 2008) who show that when households make consumption-saving
decisions, the optimal benefit profile differs substantially from the case in which house-
holds do not make the decision, as, e.g., in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997). The third property allows us to consider richer unemployment duration
dependent policies as in the previous literature. The reason for this is that we do not
have to compute the underlying wealth distribution as Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992),
Wang and Williamson (1996), and Young (2004). The combination of all three properties
– which have quantitatively and computationally important implications – is unique to the
literature.
The model we use is based on chapter 2. Households are risk-avers and make consumption-
saving, portfolio composition, and search effort decisions, the latter being unobservable to
the government which causes the moral hazard friction. Despite the ex-post heterogene-
ity due to different employment histories, the equilibrium allocation is tractable in the
sense that the equilibrium allocation can be characterized without knowing the complete
underlying endogenous wealth distribution. This property is preserved in the optimal
unemployment insurance system that is obtained by a mixed social planner – Ramsey
problem. Specifically, the government chooses wealth independent transfer rates subject
to the households’ consumption-saving and search effort decisions, which is the Ramsey
part of government’s optimization problem, and the portfolio allocation, which is the social
planner part of the government’s optimization problem.
The main results are as follows: First, conditional on being employed, the social planner
provides full insurance. This is due to the fact that there are no moral hazard frictions
3.2. ECONOMY 45
for currently employed households. Second, the optimal unemployment benefit rate is
independent of the unemployment duration. This result is consistent with Shimer and
Werning (2006, 2007, 2008) who show that under the absence of wealth effects, when
there is a consumption saving decision, the benefit profile is constant with respect to
unemployment duration. In contrast, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) find falling benefit
profiles without an endogenous consumption-saving decision. Third, while the net benefit
rate for unemployed households is quite low, there are high rewards for successful job finders
of 134 percent of their labor income. This result is consistent with Wang and Williamson
(1996) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), but we find even stronger effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents the model economy
and section 3.3 constructs the competitive equilibrium. Because this model builds on the
framework developed in chapter 2, we will keep the model description and the derivation
of the properties of the competitive equilibrium short. Section 3.4 sets up the restricted
social planner problem. In section 3.5 based on a calibrated version of the model economy,
we present some numerical results. Chapter 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical, infinitely-lived households
with unit mass who derive period utility from consumption ct and avoiding to exert job
search effort lt. For convenience we use lower case letters to denote idiosyncratic variables.
The period utility function is given by u(ct, lt) = ln ct − d(lt), with d(lt) denoting the
disutility from exerting job search effort. We assume that the utility cost of job search are
increasing and convex in the exerted search effort, d′(lt) > 0 and d′′(lt) > 0, and there is
no search independent disutility of being unemployed, d(0) = 0. For a similar specification
see, e.g., Lentz (2009).
Let st ∈ S = {e, u1, u2, u3, . . . } denote the current employment state of an arbitrary house-
hold. Households are either employed, st = e, or unemployed, st = uj, where j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
denotes the duration of the current unemployment spell. The employment history of an
arbitrary household is denoted by st = (st, st−1, st−2, . . . ). Let pi(st) denote the uncondi-
tional probability of experiencing employment history st. According to our normalization,
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the unconditional probability equals the mass of households with the respective employ-
ment history. The individual employment state follows a first-order Markov process with
pi(st+1|st) denoting the probability of ending up in state st+1 in the next period, given
the household is currently in state st. While the probability of losing a job pi(u1|e) is
exogenously given, households determine their reemployment probability pi(e|uj) by their
search effort choice. For convenience, we leave the dependence of the state transition rate
on search effort implicit. Clearly, the more search effort the household exerts, the higher
the probability of finding a new job in the subsequent period, (∂pi′(e|uj))/(∂lt) > 0, for
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . .
Households hold physical and human capital, kt and ht from which they receive capital
income rkt kt and, if they are employed, labor income rht(e) ht. There is no home produc-
tion, rht(uj) = 0. In addition, households receive (positive or negative) transfer payments
proportional to their stock of human capital and dependent on their recent state transi-
tion. Specifically, the transfer payments are given by Trt(st, st−1) ht. Disposable income
can be used for consumption and for investment into physical and human capital, xkt and
xht. Households maximize their lifetime utility with respect to consumption, investment
in physical and human capital, and search effort. The optimization problem is given by
max
{ct,xkt,xht,lt}
{
U({ct, xkt, xht, lt}∞t=0) =
∞∑
t=0
βt(ln ct − d(lt)) pi(st)
}
subject to
ct + xkt + xht = rkt kt + rht(st) ht + Trt(st, st−1) ht
kt+1 = (1− δk) kt + xkt
ht+1 = (1− δh(st)) ht + xht
kt+1 ≥ 0
ht+1 ≥ 0
with δk and δh(st) denoting the (potentially state dependent) depreciation rate for physical
and human capital.
There is a continuum of identical firms that produce the all-purpose good using physical
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and human capital as input factors. The production technology exhibits constant returns
to scale. Hence, under competitive markets, the production sector can be represented by an
aggregate firm with aggregate production technology F (Kt, H
e
t ). Kt denotes the aggregate
stock of physical capital and Het denotes the aggregate stock of human capital that is used
in production. The profit maximization problem of the firm reads
max
Kt,Het
{Π(Kt, Het ) = F (Kt, Het )− rkt Kt − rht(e) Het }
The government sets transfer rates Trt(st, st−1) conditional on the households’ recent state
transition, and it has to keep a balanced budget in each period. The per period government
budget constraint is given by
∑
st
Trt(st, st−1) ht(st) pi(st) = 0
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Following Krebs (2003), we rewrite the households’ optimization problem as a portfolio
choice problem. Define total (nonhuman and human) wealth wt
.
= kt + ht and the share of
physical capital with respect to wealth as θt
.
= kt
wt
. The return to total wealth can thus be
written as
rt(θt, st, st−1; rkt, rht, T rt(st, st−1))
= θt (rkt − δk) + (1− θt) (rht(st)− δh) + (1− θt) Trt(st, st−1), ∀st, st−1
and the constraints of the households’ optimization problem simplify to
wt+1 = (1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; rkt, rht, T rt(st, st−1))) wt − ct
0 ≤ θt+1 ≤ 1
Instead of {ct, xk,t+1, xh,t+1, lt}∞t=0, households now choose {ct, wt+1, θt+1, lt}∞t=0 subject to
the flow budget constraint and the portfolio share constraint (short-selling constraint).
We define a competitive equilibrium of this economy as follows:
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Definition 3.1 (Competitive Equilibrium).
A competitive equilibrium is
1. A sequence {Kt, Het }∞t=0 that maximizes the firm’s profit for a given sequence of factor
prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0;
2. A sequence {ct, θt+1, wt+1, lt}∞t=0 that solves the households’ optimization problem
for a given sequence of factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0, employment shocks {st}∞t=0, and
transfer payments {Trt}∞t=0;
3. A sequence {rkt, rht}∞t=0 that satisfies market clearing on the input factor market,
Kt =
∑
st θt wt(s
t) pi(st) and Het =
∑
st−1(1− θt) wt(e, st−1) pi(e, st−1), for all t;
4. A sequence of transfer payments {Trt}∞t=0 that satisfies the per period government
budget constraint for given saving policy and portfolio choice of all households.
For the firm’s optimization problem, the usual first-order conditions apply. Define the
aggregate capital-to-labor ratio K˜t
.
= Kt
Het
and the production technology in intensive form
F˜ (K˜t)
.
=
F (Kt,Het )
Het
. The profit maximization conditions are
rkt = F˜
′(K˜t)
rht = F˜ (K˜t)− K˜t F˜ ′(K˜t)
Because in equilibrium, factor prices are completely determined by the current aggregate
capital-to-labor ratio, we can rewrite the returns to individual wealth as
rt(θt, st, st−1; rkt, rht, T rt(st, st−1)) = rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))
The individual state space of an arbitrary household consists of his capital share θt, current
wealth wt, and his recent state transition (st, st−1) which determines the transfer payments
to be received. The aggregate state consists of the joint distribution of physical capital,
human capital, and the employment state, on the one hand, and of the transfer system,
on the other. For convenience, we leave the dependence of the value function from the
aggregate state implicit. Rewriting the households’ optimization problem in recursive
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form yields
V˜ (θt, wt, st, st−1) = max
ct,wt+1,θt+1,lt
{
ln ct − d(lt) + β E[V˜ (θt+1, wt+1, st+1, st)]
}
subject to
wt+1 = (1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) wt − ct
0 ≤ θt+1 ≤ 1
Substituting for consumption using the flow budget constraint, the households’ first-order
conditions with respect to wt+1, θt+1, and lt read
1
ct
= β E
[
1 + (θt+1, st+1, st; K˜t+1, T rt+1(st+1, st))
ct+1
]
(3.1)
0 = E
[
(rk,t+1 − δk)− (rh,t+1 + Trt+1(st+1, st)− δh(st+1))
ct+1
]
(3.2)
∂d(lt)
∂lt
= β
∂pi(e|uj)
∂lt
(
V˜ (θt+1, wt+1, e, uj)− V˜ (θt+1, wt+1, uj+1, uj)
)
, ∀j (3.3)
A well established result states,that under linear homogeneity of disposable income in
current wealth and homothetic preferences, the consumption and saving policies are also
linear homogenous in wealth.4 Specifically, it is easy to verify that the policies
ct = (1− β) (1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) wt (3.4)
wt+1 = β (1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) wt (3.5)
solve the consumption-saving Euler equation (3.1) and the flow budget constraint. Inspec-
tion of (3.2) reveals that the portfolio choice does not exhibit any direct dependence on
wealth if the consumption policy is linear. However, it is still possible that the portfolio
choice depends indirectly on individual wealth holdings through wealth dependence of the
4See e.g. Krebs (2003), Stokey (2009), and the previous discussion in chapter 2.
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search effort choice. By the method of guess and verify,5 we show that
V˜ (θt, wt, st, st−1) =
lnwt
1− β + V (θt, st, st−1) (3.6)
where V (θt, st, st−1) solves the intensive form Bellman equation
V (θt, st, st−1) = max
lt,θt+1
{
ln(1− β) + β
1− β ln β − d(lt)
+
ln(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1)))
1− β + βE [V (θt+1, st+1, st)]
}
(3.7)
Clearly, using (3.6), the first-order condition with respect to search effort (3.3) becomes
wealth independent as long as the portfolio choice is wealth independent. Thus, portfolio
choices and search effort decisions are independent of the individual wealth holdings, but
dependent on the current employment state, θt+1 = θt+1(st).
Having solved for the firm’s and the households’ policies, we now close the model by
analyzing market clearing on the input factor markets. Define ρt(st−1)
.
=
∑
st−2 wt(s
t−1)pi(st−1)∑
st−1 wt(st−1)pi(st−1)
as the relative wealth owned by all households whose employment state was st−1 in the
preceding period. Using the definition of the portfolio shares and the saving policy, the
law of motion of the wealth measure is given by6
ρt+1(st) =
∑
st−1 pi(st|st−1)(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) ρt(st−1)∑
st,st−1 pi(st|st−1)(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) ρt(st−1)
(3.8)
which yields the following market clearing condition
K˜t+1 =
∑
st
θt+1(st) ρt+1(st)∑
st
(1− θt+1(st)) pi(e|st) ρt+1(st) (3.9)
We summarize the equilibrium characterization in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 (Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium).
5For more details on the derivation of the value function based on the method of guess and verify, see
appendix 2.A.
6Form more details on the derivation of the law of motion of the wealth shares, see appendix 2.B.
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For any transfer scheme that satisfies the per period budget constraint of the government
∑
st,st−1
Trt(st, st−1) pi(st|st−1) ρt(st−1) = 0
a competitive equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
1. The firm’s demand for physical and human capital satisfies the usual first-order con-
ditions of profit maximization under competitive markets;
2. The households consumption and savings policies are linear homogenous in wealth
and given by (3.4) and (3.5), the portfolio choices and search effort decisions are
wealth independent and implicitly given as the solution of (3.2) and (3.3) where the
intensive form value function solves the respective intensive form Bellman equation
(3.7);
3. Market clearing satisfies (3.9) with the evolution of wealth shares governed by (3.8).
Observe that the equilibrium allocation is independent of the unconditional wealth distri-
bution. Specifically, it suffices to solve for the relative wealth owned by households of type
st−1. Clearly, the wealth ratios are a substantially easier mathematical object than the
unconditional wealth distribution.
3.4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
In a frictionless environment, the social planner would choose an allocation that provides
full insurance against income shocks. However, for the social planner, the exerted job search
effort of the individual households’ is unobservable. Providing too generous insurance
against unemployment restrain households from exerting sufficient search effort. Optimal
unemployment insurance thus has to take the existing moral hazard friction into account.
For the analysis here, we restrict to a very specific social planner problem. The social
planner’s objective function, the social welfare function, is derived under two assump-
tions: First, the social planner weighs the lifetime utility of the individual households
equally. Hence, we rule out transfer payments across types of households solely based on
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the fact that the social planner cares more about one type of agents than of than other.
Second, although we allow the social planner to choose the consumption-saving decision
of the households, we restrict to allocations that are self-enforcing in the sense that the
households’ consumption-saving Euler equations have to be satisfied. This assumption
guarantees that the linear homogenous consumption and saving policies derived in the pre-
vious section still hold. Hence, the decomposition of the value function into an intensive
form value function on the one hand, and a wealth dependent term, on the other, is still
valid. The social welfare function can now be written as∫
I
V˜ (θt, wt, st, st−1)di =
∑
st,st−1
µt(st, st−1)V (θt, st, st−1) +
∫
I
lnwt
1− βdi
where µ(st, st−1) denotes the mass of households of type (st, st−1). Clearly, with wt being
a state variable to the planner’s problem in period t, it is sufficient for the social planner
to confine attention to the social welfare function in intensive form, which is defined as the
first term on the right hand side of the equation.
We restrict our analysis to the case where a social planner can fully commit to his plans.
Clearly, this means that the current transfer scheme was determined in the previous pe-
riod and is thus a state variable to the social planner’s problem in the current period.
Hence, the social planner cannot announce a policy in the current period that induces the
households to exert high search effort and switch to a different high insurance policy after
the search effort decision materializes into low unemployment rates in the subsequent pe-
riod. This assumption has important implications on the optimal unemployment insurance
system we derive. As shown by Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997), Krusell (2002)
for redistributive policies in general and Kankanamge and Weitzenblum (2011) for unem-
ployment insurance specifically, implementing a time consistent insurance system comes
at high welfare costs compared to the case in which the social planner can fully commit.
Specifically, under limited commitment, there is more unemployment insurance at the cost
of substantially higher unemployment. The optimal unemployment insurance system we
derive is thus under the absence of this implementability friction.
Because search effort is unobservable for the social planner, the households’ first-order con-
ditions with respect to search effort enter as an additional constraint to the social planner’s
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optimization problem. With individual value functions entering the constraints, standard
dynamic programming techniques are not valid.7 The standard way of dealing with this
problem is to define a broader state space that also includes the current lifetime utility
of the individual households. As shown by Spear and Srivastava (1987), the social plan-
ner problem is recursive on this new state space, making standard dynamic programming
techniques applicable. However, this method comes at the cost that not every solution to
the first-order conditions of this augmented problem is a solution to the original planner
problem. Thus, we have to check whether the promised utility of the candidate solution
solves the households’ functional equation when the consumption and saving policies as
well as the portfolio choices are given by the candidate solution.
For the incentive problem considered here, it suffices to consider the difference in lifetime
utility. Thus, instead of lifetime utility, we only include the difference of lifetime utili-
ties as state variable, reducing the dimension of the state space. Define ∆Vt(uj, st−1)
.
=
V (θt, e, st−1)−Vt(θt, uj, st−1), j = 1, 2, 3, . . . as the utility difference. From the households’
utility functions, we get
∆Vt(uj, st−1)) = d(l(uj)) +
ln(1 + rt(θt, e, st−1; K˜t, T rt(e, st−1)))
1− β
− ln(1 + rt(θt, uj, st−1; K˜t, T rt(uj, st−1)))
1− β
− β
[
pi(u1|e)∆Vt+1(u1, e)− pi(uj+1|uj)∆Vt+1(uj+1, uj)
]
+ β
ln(1 + rt+1(θt+1, e, e; K˜t+1, T rt+1(e, e)))
1− β
− β ln(1 + rt+1(θt+1, e, uj; K˜t+1, T rt+1(e, uj)))
1− β ,∀j = 1, 2,
This condition is the promise keeping constraint since it requires the government to deliver
the utility difference ∆Vt(uj, st−1) that was promised in the previous period.
Let W (θt, kt, ρt, µt, T rt,∆Vt) denote the social welfare. The social planner chooses the port-
folio share θt+1(st), the search effort lt(st), the capital-to-labor ratio K˜t, the wealth shares
ρt+1(st), the distribution of households across states µt+1(st+1, st), the transition depen-
dent transfer payments Trt+1(st+1, st), and the promised utility difference ∆Vt+1(uj+1, st)
7See, e.g. Abraham and Pavoni (2008), Mele (2010), and Marcet and Marimon (2011).
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for all household types in order to maximize
Wt(θt, K˜t, ρt, µt, T rt,∆Vt) = max
θt+1,lt,K˜t+1,ρt+1,µt+1,T rt+1,∆Vt+1
{
B −
∑
j,st−1
µ(uj, st−1) d(l)
+
∑
st,st−1
µ(st, st−1)
ln(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1)))
1− β
+ β Wt+1(θt+1, K˜t+1, ρt+1, µt+1, T rt+1,∆Vt+1)
}
subject to
i.) the promise keeping constraint
∆Vt(uj, st−1)) = d(l(uj)) +
ln(1 + rt(θt, e, st−1; K˜t, T rt(e, st−1)))
1− β
− ln(1 + rt(θt, uj, st−1; K˜t, T rt(uj, st−1)))
1− β
− β
[
pi(u1|e)∆Vt+1(u1, e)− pi(uj+1|uj)∆Vt+1(uj+1, uj)
]
+ β
ln(1 + rt+1(θt+1, e, e; K˜t+1, T rt+1(e, e)))
1− β
− β ln(1 + rt+1(θt+1, e, uj; K˜t+1, T rt+1(e, uj)))
1− β , ∀j = 1, 2, . . .
ii.) the incentive compatibility constraint
∂d(lt)
∂lt
= β
∂pi(e|uj)
∂lt
∆Vt+1(uj+1, uj)
iii.)the evolution of wealth shares
ρt+1(st) =
∑
st−1 pi(st|st−1)(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) ρt(st−1)∑
st,st−1 pi(st|st−1)(1 + rt(θt, st, st−1; K˜t, T rt(st, st−1))) ρt(st−1)
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iv.)the market clearing condition
K˜t+1 =
∑
st
θt+1(st) ρt+1(st)∑
st
(1− θt+1(st)) pi(e|st) ρt+1(st)
v.)the government budget constraint
0 =
∑
st+1,st
Trt+1(st+1, st) pi(st+1|st) ρt+1(st)
vi.)the evolution of population shares
µt+1(st+1, st) =
∑
st−1
pi(st+1|st) µt(st, st−1)
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
3.5.1 Specification and Calibration
The quantitative analysis here uses two additional restrictions. First, we impose an ad hoc
irreversibility constraint on human capital, which restricts the social planner in his port-
folio choices and transfer policies for unemployed households. Specifically, for unemployed
households the choices have to satisfy (1 − θt+1) wt+1 ≥ (1 − δh(st)) (1 − θt) wt. With
saving policies that are linear homogenous in wealth, this condition is wealth independent
as well. Second, we focus on the long-run (stationary) optimal unemployment insurance
system, although we are aware that the welfare gains may be offset by costly transition
phases, as demonstrated by Gilles and Weitzenblum (2003).
The model is calibrated on a monthly basis to match stylized facts of the US economy.
In particular, we calibrate to match the elasticity of the job finding rate with respect
to benefit payments, the unemployment rate, and the monthly equilibrium growth rate.
This approach is motivated by two observations: First, the elasticity takes central stage
in determining the employment effects of changes in the unemployment benefit system,
as shown in the sensitivity analysis of chapter 2. Second, the growth rate is key for the
determination of the welfare effect. Specifically, the welfare effect is mainly determined by
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the consumption volatility of the employed households and its magnitude is directly linked
to the the average consumption growth.
Table 3.1: Calibration - Exogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
A parameter of disutility of search 1.0000
β time preference rate 0.9950
production
α capital share 0.3600
depreciation rates
δk depreciation rate: physical capital 0.0050
δh(st) depreciation rate: human capital if employed 0.0050
labor market and transition rates
pi(u1|e) monthly job destruction rate 0.0300
The functional forms are specified as follows: the production technology is of the Cobb-
Douglas type, F (Kt, H
e
t ) = z K
α
t H
e(1−α)
t , the disutility of search is a power function
d(lt) = A l
ζ
t , and the job search technology is an exponential function pi(e|st) = 1− e−λlt .8
We set the capital share in production α to 0.36, and the depreciation rates of physical
and human capital δk and δh(st) to 0.0050 which amounts to six percent per annum. The
depreciation rate of physical capital is within the range suggested by the literature. In
contrast, the individual depreciation rate of human capital is estimated to be between
zero and four percent per annum.9 However, our infinite horizon model has to account
for the additional mortality based human capital depreciation, which is not included in
the estimates. Assuming a working life span of 50 years, we have to add an additional
depreciation of 2 percent per annum, which makes our chosen value for the depreciation rate
to be at the upper end of the range. Following Shimer (2005), the monthly job separation
8For the specification of the disutility function and the job search technology, see e.g. Lentz (2009).
9See Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
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rate pi(u1|e) is three percent. The time preference factor β is set to 0.9950 which is 0.94
on an annual basis. Moreover, the scaling factor of disutility of search effort A is set to
one. Actually this value is no restriction since it cannot be identified independently from
the search technology parameter λ that will be used to match the unemployment rate of 8
percent. The curvature of the disutility function is set to five, which implies an equilibrium
reemployment elasticity of −0.25, as found by Meyer and Mok (2007).10 Finally, setting
the scaling parameter of the production technology to 0.0155 yields a monthly consumption
growth rate of 0.2 percent, which amounts to approximately three percent per annum.
Table 3.2: Calibration - Endogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
ζ curvature of disutility of search 5.0000
production
z productivity 0.0155
labor market and transition rates
λ search technology parameter: 3.0000
parameters are chosen to match
aggregate monthly consumption growth rate 0.0025
unemployment rate 0.0750
average benefit elasticity of reemployment probability −0.2500
3.5.2 Results
There are three main results: First, in the absence of any moral hazard friction for em-
ployed households, the government provides full insurance conditional on being employed.
Specifically, the consumption growth rate is 0.27 percent, for sure. If households remain
employed until the next period, the transfer payments are negative and can be interpreted
10For a more detailed discussion how this parameter is calibrated, see chapter 2.
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as a labor income tax of 7.2 percent. In contrast, when becoming unemployed, households
receive transfer payments that amount to 92.8 percent of their previous gross income.
Second, transfer rates to unemployed households that are unemployed for at least 2 periods
are independent of the duration of the current unemployment spell. This result is due to the
absence of wealth effects when preferences are homothetic and disposable income is linear
homogenous in wealth. Our result is similar to Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008) who
get rid of the wealth effects by using a CARA utility specification. However, the optimal de-
trended consumption profile for unemployed households is nevertheless decreasing, because
the unemployed’s wealth position grows at a lower rate than the economy wide average
wealth positions.
Third, for unemployed households, benefit payments are quite low at 5.5 percent of the
gross wage (and 12.7 percent of net wages compared to households that are employed for
at least two periods). However, if unemployed households are successful job seekers, they
receive a reward as high as 134 percent of their gross wage. The government uses the spread
between the low benefit rate for unemployed and the high reward for successful job seekers
to provide sufficient incentives for the households to exert search effort. Although this
result is not new to the literature, see e.g. Wang and Williamson (1996) and Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997), we find a substantial higher spread, again mainly due to the absence
of wealth effects.
Table 3.3: Results
employment state consumption growth rate implied benefit rate
st+1 = e st+1 = uj+1 st+1 = e st+1 = uj+1
st = e +0.27% +0.27% −7.2% +92.8%
st+1 = uj +1.0% −0.20% +134% +5.42%
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3.6 Conclusions
We constructed a specific social planner problem that allowed us to compute an optimal
unemployment insurance system in a dynamic general equilibrium model with publicly un-
observable job search effort by the households without solving for the within type wealth
distribution. Our quantitative results are derived under the assumption that the govern-
ment can fully commit to its policy plans. The main results are as follows: first, there is
full insurance for currently employed households, second, the optimal profile of the benefit
rate is independent of the duration of the current unemployment spell, and third, benefits
are low for unemployed households but the reward for successful job search is substantial.
The results are consistent with the existing literature on optimal unemployment insurance.
There are two directions for future research building on the model presented here. First,
we plan to use the model to derive more theoretical results on optimal unemployment
insurance, in particular concerning the importance of the general equilibrium effect. The
wealth independence of the optimal unemployment insurance system may will simplify
the analysis substantially. We will analyze the general equilibrium effect in a calibrated
version of the model economy quantitatively. Second, we plan to extend the analysis to
limited commitment of the government in the sense that it can deviate from its previously
announced policies. Clearly, since the current transfer scheme has no impact on the house-
holds’ allocation decisions, the government is tempted to provide more insurance in the
current period. As argued by Kankanamge and Weitzenblum (2011), the time-consistent
unemployment insurance system under limited commitment can be fundamentally different
from the optimal unemployment insurance system under full commitment. This analysis
will shed light on the question on how quantitatively important this additional friction is.
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Chapter 4
Human Capital Risk, Public
Consumption, and Optimal Taxation
4.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by two empirical observations. First, there is strong evidence that
human capital investment is risky, but complete insurance against this risk is lacking. More
precisely, a significant fraction of labor income is the return to human capital investment,
and a voluminous empirical literature has shown that individual households face large and
highly persistent labor income shocks that have strong effects on individual consumption.1
Second, in most developed countries, governments spend a significant amount of total out-
put and a large fraction of this spending is used to provide public services to all households
regardless of their economic status. In this paper, we show that both observations taken
together imply that, in equilibrium, households always invest less in risky human capital
than socially optimal. In other words, a subsidy to human capital investment financed
through an incentive-neutral tax will improve social welfare. Moreover, we calibrate the
model to US data and show that the growth and welfare gains from implementing the
optimal policy are large when the labor-leisure choice is endogenous.
1For the estimation of income risk, see, for example, MaCurdy (1982), Carroll and Samwick (1997),
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). For the consumption response,
see, for example, Cochrane (1991), Flavin (1981), Townsend (1995), and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008).
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There is a straightforward economic intuition for the sub-optimality of the equilibrium
allocation without taxes and subsidies. In addition to the consumption-saving decision,
households have to allocate their investment between a low-return, risk-free asset (physical
capital in our model) and a high return, risky asset (human capital in our model), which
in turn determines the mean and volatility of individual consumption growth. When
making their portfolio decisions, individual households take aggregate variables, and in
particular the level of output and public consumption services, as given. Thus, they do
not take into account that more investment in the high-return asset, human capital, will
increase aggregate output and, as shown in this paper, the optimal level of publicly provided
consumption services. If private consumption and public consumption had the same degree
of riskiness, then this would not pose a problem for the optimality of the market outcome.
However, if public consumption is less risky than private consumption, then in equilibrium
the private risk-return trade-off differs from the social risk-return trade-off, and it becomes
socially optimal to provide additional incentives for risk-taking.2
In this paper, we formalize the above intuition using a tractable endogenous growth model
with incomplete markets. In our framework, households have the opportunity to invest
in physical capital and human capital. While investment in physical capital is risk-free,
human capital is subject to idiosyncratic depreciation shocks that are uninsurable and
directly translate into permanent earning shocks. The government provides public services
that are independent of idiosyncratic human capital shocks, has access to a linear system
of taxes and subsidies, and runs a balanced budget. For given government policy, our
model is tractable in the sense that the equilibrium allocation can be characterized and
computed without solving for the underlying wealth distribution. Using this tractability
result, we characterize the optimal government policy and show theoretically the optimality
of a human capital subsidy.
For the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to match a number of stylized facts
for the US economy. We find that in the baseline model with fixed labor-leisure choice, the
optimal human capital subsidy is substantial, but switching from a zero-tax environment3
2From a different point of view, the presence of risk-free publicly provided consumption services works
like an insurance system since the government applies a transfer scheme that shifts resources from risky
private consumption to risk-free publicly provided consumption.
3In the optimal capital taxation literature that builds upon Chamley (1986) and ?, finds that in the
long-run, optimal tax rates on accumulable factors are zero. We use this result as benchmark of the
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to the optimal system generates only small growth and welfare gains because of strong
general equilibrium effects. More precisely, for given returns (partial equilibrium), an in-
crease in human capital increases economic growth since human capital is the high-risk,
high-return investment opportunity. In general equilibrium, this positive growth effect is
dwarfed by a reduction in human capital returns since more human capital reduces the
marginal product of labor, and our quantitative analysis reveals that the general equilib-
rium effect is quite strong. However, once we allow for an endogenous labor-leisure choice,
a corresponding increase in labor-time results in only small changes in the marginal prod-
uct of labor despite a large increase in human capital, and the growth and welfare effects
of switching to the optimal government policy therefore become large.
This paper is related to the extensive literature on optimal income taxation analyzing the
so-called Ramsey problem (Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986)).4 Most papers in this lit-
erature assume a representative household, but Aiyagari (1995), Davila, Hong, Krusell,
and Rios-Rull (2005), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), and Imrohoroglu (1998), have
also considered the effect of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and / or binding borrowing con-
straints. However, none of these papers allows for a risky investment opportunity. Recently,
Panousi (2007) has analyzed optimal income taxation in a model with entrepreneurial risk,
but she does not consider the endogenous choice of government spending. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper to study optimal taxation and government spending
in an economy with idiosyncratic investment risk.5
There is also a theoretical literature that uses two-period models to study the welfare effects
of income taxation when human capital investment is risky. In particular, Eaton and Rosen
(1980) argue that linear labor income taxes may reduce human capital investment risk, so
that it becomes optimal to tax labor income and simultaneously subsidize human capital
investment to compensate for the des-incentive effect of the labor income tax. Clearly, in
this paper we emphasize a very different economic mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the economic environ-
underlying quantitative analysis.
4There is also an important strand of the literature analyzing optimal taxation in asymmetric-
information economies (Mirrlees (2005) and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003); for a recent
review, see Kocherlakota (2005)).
5Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also consider a setting in which it is socially optimal to encourage risk
taking, but their argument is very different from ours.
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ment and constructs a competitive equilibrium of the model economy. In section 4.3, we
derive the main theoretical results for the baseline model, and in section 4.4, we use cali-
brated versions of the model economy for a quantitative analysis of the benchmark model
as well as further specifications. Finally, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
This section develops the model that underlies the theoretical and quantitative analysis
conducted in the subsequent sections. As in Krebs (2003), there is a competitive production
sector using a production function that displays constant returns to scale with respect
to the two input factors, physical capital and efficient labor. Households are ex-ante
identical, infinitely-lived and have the opportunity to invest in physical and human capital.
Investment in physical capital is risk-free, but investment in human capital is subject to
idiosyncratic depreciation shocks. The government provides consumption services that
enter directly the households’ utility function, and levies linear taxes on capital, labor and
consumption in order to satisfy a balanced budget constraint.
4.2.1 The Economy
Consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon economy with one non-perishable good that can
be either consumed or invested. Competition on the input factor markets and the neo-
classical production technology allows the representation of the production sector by an
aggregate firm that takes factor prices as given. The aggregate firm uses physical capi-
tal Kt and efficiency units of labor LtHt to produce the all-purpose good. The production
technology is given by Yt = F (Kt, LtHt), where Lt denotes hours worked, Ht human capital
and thus, LtHt denotes efficiency units of hours worked. The rental rate of physical capital
is rkt and the rental rate of efficiency units of hours worked is rht. In each period, the firm
hires capital and labor up to the point where current profits are maximized. Hence, the
firm solves the following static maximization problem:
max
Kt,LtHt
{F (Kt, LtHt)− rktKt − rhtLtHt} (4.1)
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There are many ex-ante identical, infinitely-lived households with total mass of one. House-
holds have identical preferences over private consumption plans {ct}∞t=0, private hours
worked choices {lt}∞t=0 and the sequence of publicly provided consumption services {Gt}∞t=0.
For convenience, let lower-case letters denote individual-specific variables and upper-case
letters denote aggregate variables. The specification of the utility function closely follows
Barro (1990) and Guo and Lansing (1999). The one period utility function is logarithmic,
and with β denoting the time preference rate, expected lifetime utility is given by
U({ct, lt, Gt}∞t=0) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt(ln ct + νl ln(1− lt) + νg lnGt)
]
(4.2)
where νl and νg are utility parameters that measure how the household values labor and
publicly provided consumption services.
Let kt and ht stand for the stock of physical and human capital owned by an individual
household, and xkt and xht denote the corresponding investment in physical and human
capital. The fraction φ of human capital investment is bought with foregone earnings,
whereas the fraction (1 − φ) is directly bought by spending wealth. Physical capital in-
vestments are, as usual, completely bought with wealth. Capital and labor markets are
perfectly competitive and the government taxes (or subsidizes) capital and labor income
at the flat rate τkt and τht. In addition, the government can tax consumption at rate τct.
For convenience, we define τt = (τkt, τht, τct). The sequential budget constraint reads
(1 + τct) ct + xkt + (1− φ) xht = (1− τkt) rkt kt + (1− τht)(lt rht ht − φ xht) (4.3)
kt+1 = (1− δk) kt + xkt, kt ≥ 0
ht+1 = (1− δh + ηt) ht + xht, ht ≥ 0
(k0, h0, η0) given.
with δk and δh denoting the average depreciation rate of physical capital and human cap-
ital. The term ηt is a household-specific shock to human capital. We assume that these
idiosyncratic shocks are identically and independently distributed across households and
across time.6 The random variable ηt represents uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income
6The budget constraint (4.3) makes two implicit assumptions about the accumulation of human capital.
First, it lumps together general human capital (education and health) and specific human capital (on-the-
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risk. A negative human capital shock, ηt < 0, can occur when a worker loses firm- or sector-
specific human capital subsequent to job termination. In order to preserve the tractability
of the model, the budget constraint rules out extended periods of unemployment because
it assumes that wages are received in each period. Thus, the emphasis is on earnings un-
certainty, not employment uncertainty. A decline in health provides a second example for
a negative human capital shock. In this case, general and specific human capital might be
lost. Internal promotions and upward movement in the labor market provide two exam-
ples of positive human capital shocks (ηt > 0). It is natural to assume that human capital
shocks can never lead to the total destruction of the existing human capital stock, thus
restricting the domain of the shock distribution to ηt ∈ (−(1− δh),∞).
Constraint (4.3) permits households to save and dissave at the going interest rate, but does
not allow for the negative financial wealth (kt ≥ 0 and ht ≥ 0). Thus, one might conjecture
that the equilibrium will change once households are allowed to accumulate debt. However,
this is not the case for the model analyzed here, because income shocks are permanent and
not transitory and as shown in Kuhn (2008), non-negativity constraints will never bind in
such an environment. More precisely, the introduction of a risk-free bond does not change
the equilibrium allocation as long as the bond interest rate, rbt, is given by rbt = rkt − δk.
For given initial state (k0, h0, η0) and given fiscal policy, {τt, Gt}∞t=0, an individual house-
hold chooses a plan, {ct, kt+1, ht+1, lt}∞t=0, that maximizes his expected lifetime utility (4.2)
subject to the budget constraint (4.3). Clearly, in each period, the choice (ct, kt+1, ht+1, lt)
is a function of the history of idiosyncratic shocks, ηt = (η0, . . . , ηt).
7
The budget constraint (4.3) can be rewritten in a way that shows that the households’
optimization problem is a standard portfolio choice problem. To see this, define total
wealth of an individual household as wt
.
= kt + ht and the fraction of total wealth invested
in physical capital and human capital as θt
.
= kt/wt and (1 − θt) .= ht/wt, respectively.
job training). Second, (4.3) does not impose a non-negativity constraint on human capital investment
(xht ≥ 0).
7Note that the tax system τt may depend on t, but not on idiosyncratic shocks ηt. In this sense, the
tax system does not provide insurance against idiosyncratic human capitals shocks.
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Using this notation, the budget constraint simplifies to
wt+1 =
(1 + rt) wt − (1 + τct) ct
θt+1 + (1− φ τht) (1− θt+1) (4.4)
wt ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1
(k0, h0, η0) given.
with the total investment return defined as
rt
.
= θt [(1− τkt) rkt + (1− δk)]
+ (1− θt) [(1− τht) lt rht + (1− δh + ηt) (1− φ τht)]− 1 (4.5)
Equation (4.5) defines the return to investment function rt = r(θt, lt, ηt; rkt, rht, τkt, τht).
Clearly, maximizing (4.2) with respect to {ct, kt+1, ht+1, lt}∞t=0 subject to the budget
constraint (4.3) is equivalent to maximizing (4.2) with respect to {ct, wt+1, lt, θt+1}∞t=0
subject to the budget constraint (4.4).
Finally, we assume that the government runs a balanced budget in each period which rules
out extended periods of government debt. Thus, the government budget constraint reads
τht
(
rht E[lt(1− θt)wt]− φ E[(1− θt+1)wt+1 − (1− δh + ηt)(1− θt)wt]
)
+ τkt rkt E[θtwt] + τct E[ct] = Gt (4.6)
From now on, we restrict the government to provide publicly consumption services propor-
tional to the size of the economy. In particular, Gt = µt E[ct].8
4.2.2 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of our model economy is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Competitive Equilibrium).
For any given initial distribution (w0, θ0, l0), a competitive equilibrium is
8Taking BEA-data from 1970 to 2009, the government-to-household consumption ratio decreased from
29 percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 2000 and started to rise again to approximately 24 percent. In the
long-run a constant ratio seems to be a good approximation.
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1. A sequence of {Kt, LtHt}∞t=0 that solves the firm’s maximization problem (4.1) for
given factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0;
2. A sequence of {ct, wt+1, lt, θt+1}∞t=0 that solves the household’s optimization problem
(4.2) subject to (4.4) for a given sequence of factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0, idiosyncratic
shocks {ηt}∞t=0 and fiscal policy {τt, µt}∞t=0, for all households;
3. A sequence of factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0 that is consistent with market clearing on
the input factor markets, Kt = E[θtwt] and LtHt = E[lt(1− θt)wt];
4. A sequence of fiscal policy {τt, µt}∞t=0 that satisfies the government’s balanced budget
constraint (4.6) for given factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0 and household policy {ct, wt+1, lt,
θt+1}∞t=0, for all households.
Introduce the aggregate capital to labor ratio K˜t
.
= Kt
LtHt
and the production function in
intensive form f(K˜t)
.
= F (K˜t, 1). Using this notation, the first-order conditions associated
with the firm’s static profit maximization problem (4.1) are
rkt = f
′(K˜t)
rht = f(K˜t)− K˜t f ′(K˜t)
Thus, rkt = rk(K˜t), rht = rh(K˜t). Note, in equilibrium, any sequence of factor prices is
completely determined by a corresponding sequence of capital-to-labor ratios {K˜t}∞t=0. For
convenience, we write r(θt, lt, ηt; rk(K˜t), rh(K˜t), τkt, τht) = r(θt, lt, ηt; K˜t, τkt, τht).
We now discuss the households’ optimization problem. The first-order conditions with
respect to wt+1, θt+1 and lt read
θt+1 + (1− φ τht)(1− θt+1)
(1 + τct) ct
= βE
[
1 + r(θt+1, lt+1, ηt+1; K˜t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
(1 + τc,t+1) ct+1
]
(4.7)
νl
1− lt = (1− θt)
(1− τht) rh(K˜t)
(1 + τct)
wt
ct
(4.8)
φ τht
(1 + τct) ct
= βE
[
rˆk(K˜t+1, τk,t+1)− rˆh(lt+1, ηt+1; K˜t+1, τh,t+1)
(1 + τc,t+1) ct+1
]
(4.9)
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where
rˆkt(K˜t, τkt) = (1− τkt) rk(K˜t) + (1− δk)
rˆht(lt, ηt; K˜t, τht) = (1− τht) lt rh(K˜t) + (1− δh + ηt) (1− φ τht)
denote the current returns to physical and human capital net of depreciation and taxes /
subsidies. The consumption-saving Euler equation (4.7) requires that the utility cost of
saving one more unit of the all-purpose good must be equal to the expected discounted
utility gain. The intratemporal first-order-condition (4.8) equates the marginal utility gain
from leisure against the marginal benefit of working. Finally, the intertemporal first-order-
condition (4.9) states that in the optimum, households are indifferent between investing
one more unit into physical capital and one more unit into human capital. Because of the
assumption that idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed over time, it suffices to
take the unconditional expectation with respect to ηt+1.
Any plan {ct, wt+1, lt, θt+1}∞t=0 that is a solution to the first-order conditions (4.7), (4.8),
(4.9) and the budget constraint (4.4) and satisfies a corresponding transversality condition
is also a solution to the utility maximization problem. Direct calculation shows that the
consumption and saving policies
ct =
1− β
1 + τct
(1 + r(θt, lt, ηt; K˜t, τkt, τht)) wt (4.10)
wt+1 =
β
(θt+1 + (1− φ τht) (1− θt+1)) (1 + r(θt, lt, ηt; K˜t, τkt, τht)) wt (4.11)
satisfy the household’s budget constraint (4.4) and solve the consumption-saving Euler
equation. Plugging the consumption and saving policies in the first-order-conditions with
respect to hours worked (4.8), and solving for lt finally yields the policy function for hours
worked
lt =
1
(1 + (1− β) νl)
− νl (1− β) θt ((1− τkt) rk(K˜t) + (1− δk)) + (1− θt) (1− δh + ηt) (1− φ τht)
(1− θt) (1− τht) rh(K˜t) (1 + (1− β) νl)
(4.12)
Note that (4.12) defines a function lt = l(θt, ηt; K˜t, τkt, τht). In particular, by the linearity
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of lt in the idiosyncratic shock ηt, we find E[l(θt, ηt; K˜t, τkt, τht)] = l(θt, E[ηt]; K˜t, τkt, τht).
Using the policy functions (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12), the first-order condition with respect
to the portfolio share θt+1 simplifies to
φ τht
(θt+1 + (1− φ τht) (1− θt+1))
= E
[
rˆk(K˜t+1, τk,t+1)− rˆh(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
1 + r(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
]
(4.13)
Since the idiosyncratic shock ηt+1 integrates out, the portfolio choice θt+1 only depends
on aggregate variables. Therefore, each household chooses the same capital share in his
portfolio. The previously characterized plan {ct, wt+1, lt, θt+1}∞t=0 solves the set of the
households’ first-order conditions and it is straightforward to show that it also satisfies the
associated transversality condition and, thus, is a solution to the utility maximization of
an individual household. We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 (Solution to the Household’s Optimization Problem).
Given the initial distribution over (w0, θ0, l0). For any given sequence of tax rates
{τct, τkt, τht}∞t=0 and for any given sequence of capital-to-labor ratios {K˜t}∞t=0, the solution
to the household’s optimization problem is characterized as follows:
1. The optimal consumption and saving policies are linear homogenous in current wealth
and explicitly given by (4.10) and (4.11);
2. The optimal labor-leisure choice is independent of the households’ wealth but depends
on the current portfolio and current realization of the idiosyncratic shock; the policy
function is explicitly given by (4.12);
3. The optimal portfolio choice is independent of the household’s wealth and realization
of the idiosyncratic shock; thus, every household chooses the same portfolio and θt+1
is implicitly given as the solution to (4.13).
Having characterized the households’ decision problem, we now discuss the market clearing
condition. In equilibrium, the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio has to be consistent with
the investment choices of the households. By definition, kt = θtwt and ht = (1− θt)wt and
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since every agent chooses the same θt+1 for t ≥ 0, market clearing is given by
K˜∗t =

E[θt wt]
E[l(θt, ηt; K˜∗t , τkt, τht) (1− θt) wt]
for t = 0
θt
l(θt, E[ηt]; K˜∗t , τkt, τht) (1− θt)
for t > 0
(4.14)
Since we allow for arbitrary initial distributions of wealth, portfolios and idiosyncratic
shocks, we cannot guarantee mutual independence of w0, θ0 and η0. However, for t > 0, we
know that θt and lt are independent of wealth, and, moreover, every household chooses the
same capital share in his portfolio. This allows us to simplify the market clearing condition
for t > 0 further, as we already did in (4.14). The equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio K˜∗t is a
fixed point to (4.14) for given portfolio choices and tax rates. The equilibrium path of the
capital-to-labor ratio, {K˜∗t }∞t=0, is completely determined by the initial distribution over
(w0, θ0, η0), the complete sequence of capital and labor income taxes {τkt, τht}∞t=0 and by
the corresponding sequence of capital shares {θt+1}∞t=0 that solve the respective first-order
condition of the household
φ τht
(θt+1 + (1− φ τht) (1− θt+1)) = E
[
rˆk(K˜
∗
t+1, τk,t+1)− rˆh(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜∗t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
1 + r(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜∗t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
]
More compactly, we write
IC(θt+1, K˜
∗
t+1, τht, τk,t+1, τh,t+1) = 0 (4.15)
Note that this condition already uses the optimal policy functions for consumption, saving
and leisure and thus satisfies the respective first-order condition and the household’s budget
constraint, by construction. We denote the first-order condition mnemonically by IC, since
it will be the implementability for the social planner below.
Using the households’ plans as characterized in proposition 4.1 as well as the capital-to-
labor ratio that satisfies market clearing, K˜∗t , we find that the government budget constraint
is independent of the current size of the economy. Again, using a more compact formulation,
the government budget constraint reads
GC(θt, θt+1, K˜
∗
t , τt, µt) = 0 (4.16)
72 CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL TAXATION OF RISKY CAPITAL
For any initial distribution over (w0, θ0, η0), and for any given sequence {θt+1, τkt, τht}∞t=0,
the government can freely choose a sequence of consumption taxes and publicly provided
consumption services {τct, µt}∞t=0 that balances its budget out without distorting the equi-
librium decisions of the firm and the households.
The following proposition summarizes our previous discussion and characterizes the set of
competitive equilibria.
Proposition 4.2 (Competitive General Equilibrium).
For any given initial distribution over (w0, θ0), the set of equilibria EQ is defined as
EQ =
{
{θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 | {θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 satisfies
{IC(θt+1, K˜∗t+1, τht, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)}∞t=0 and {GC(θt, θt+1, K˜∗t , τt, µt)}∞t=0
}
(4.17)
In short, we can think of an equilibrium as a joint sequences {θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 that satisfies
the implementability constraint, (4.15), and the government’s budget constraint, (4.16).
Importantly, the equilibrium is independent of the actual wealth distribution.
4.3 Optimal Taxation: Theoretical Results
For the derivation of the theoretical results, we use a simplified version of our model, which
is specified in the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1.
1. There is no disutility of work, νl = 0, and households supply a fixed amount of hours
worked that we conveniently normalize to unity, lt = 1, ∀t.
2. Human capital is solely bought by spending the all-purpose good, φ = 0.
The second part of the assumption, φ = 0, implies that the implementability and the
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government budget constraint simplify to
IC(θt+1, K˜
∗
t+1, τht, τk,t+1, τh,t+1) = IC(θt+1, K˜
∗
t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)
GC(θt, θt+1, K˜
∗
t , τt, µt) = GC(θt, K˜
∗
t , τt, µt)
For any given sequence of capital and labor income tax rates, {τkt, τht}∞t=0, proposition
4.1 specifies the equilibrium plan of consumption and wealth chosen by individual house-
holds. The particular representation of the equilibrium plan allows us to characterize the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium in a simple and transparent manner. Using the households’
policy functions for a given fiscal policy {τt, µt}∞t=0, expected lifetime utility from private
consumption can be calculated as
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct
]
= E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt ln
(
1− β
1 + τct
βt
t∏
n=0
(1 + r(θn, ηn; K˜
∗
n, τkn, τhn)) w0
)]
= h(w0)−
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln(1 + τct) +
t∑
n=0
E
[
ln(1 + r(θn, ηn; K˜
∗
n, τkn, τhn))
])
where h(w0) is a function of the underlying model parameters and the initial wealth dis-
tribution. The welfare effect of any fiscal policy {τt, µt}∞t=1 is independent of the initial
wealth and asset distribution (w0, θ0). Similarly, the portfolio choices {θt+1}∞t=0 are inde-
pendent of (w0, θ0), as well. Thus, any Pareto-optimal equilibrium is preferred by all types
of households, (w0, θ0), over all alternative equilibria, such that the set of Pareto-optimal
equilibria is independent of the initial distribution over household types. More precisely,
any Pareto-optimal equilibrium is the solution to the following constrained social planner
problem9
max
{θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0
V ({θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0) (4.18)
9Here, we use the terminology of constrained and unconstrained problems in the pure mathematical
sense and do not associate them with the information structure in the economy, as it is often done in the
literature.
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subject to
{θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 ∈
{
{θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 | {θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0 satisfies
{IC(θt+1, K˜∗t+1, τk,t+1, τh,t+1)}∞t=0 and {GC(θt, K˜∗t , τt, µt)}∞t=0
}
(4.19)
where the objective function in (4.18) is defined as
V ({θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0) = (1 + νg)
(
h(w0)−
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(1 + τct)
)
+ νg
∞∑
t=0
βt lnµt
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
n=0
E
[
ln(1 + r(θn, ηn; K˜
∗
n, τkn, τhn))
]
+ νg
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
n=0
ln(1 + r(θn, E[ηn]; K˜∗n, τkn, τhn))
The constrained social planner problem can be transformed into an unconstrained social
planner problem as follows. Define
Tt = θt τkt rkt(K˜
∗
t ) + (1− θt) τht rht(K˜∗t )
which measures to what extend total investment is taxed (Tt > 0), respectively subsidized
(Tt < 0). Using the new notation, the government budget constraint (4.6) can be written
as
τct =
µt (1− β) (1 + r(θt, E[ηt]; K˜∗t , 0, 0)− Tt)− Tt
(1− β) (1 + r(θt, E[ηt]; K˜∗t , 0, 0)− Tt) + Tt
(4.20)
This defines a function τct = τc(θt, µt, Tt). For any choice (θt, µt, Tt), the government
budget constraint can be satisfied by choosing τct according to τc(θt, µt, Tt). Similarly,
direct calculation shows that for any choice of (θt, µt, Tt), the implementability constraint
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(4.15) will hold if capital and labor income taxes are
τh,t+1 = −
(
E
[
rh(K˜
∗
t+1)
1 + r(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜∗t+1, 0, 0)− Tt+1
])−1
× E
[
θt+1 ((rk(K˜
∗
t+1)− δk)− (rh(K˜∗t+1)− δh + ηt+1))− Tt+1
1 + r(θt+1, ηt+1; K˜∗t+1, 0, 0)− Tt+1
]
(4.21)
τk,t+1 =
Tt+1 − (1− θt+1) rk(K˜∗t+1) τh,t+1
θt+1 rk(K˜∗t+1)
(4.22)
This defines functions τht = τh(θt, µt, Tt) and τkt = τk(θt, µt, Tt). The constrained social
planner problem (4.18) subject to (4.19) is equivalent to the unconstrained social planner
problem
max
{θt+1, µt, Tt}∞t=0
V˜ ({θt+1, τt, µt}∞t=0) (4.23)
where
V˜ ({θt+1, µt, Tt}∞t=0) = (1 + νg)
(
h(w0)−
∞∑
t=0
βt ln(1 + τc(θt, Tt, µt))
)
+ νg
∞∑
t=0
βt lnµt
+
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
n=0
E
[
ln(1 + r(θn, ηn; K˜
∗
n, 0, 0)− Tn)
]
+
+ νg
∞∑
t=0
βt
t∑
n=0
ln(1 + r(θn, E[ηn]; K˜∗n, 0, 0)− Tn)
The discussion above is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3 (Equivalence of Constrained and Unconstrained Planner Problem).
Any Pareto-optimal equilibrium allocation can be found by solving either the constrained so-
cial planner problem, (4.18) subject to (4.19), or the unconstrained social planner problem,
(4.23).
Straightforward but tedious calculations reveal that the objective function in (4.23) is
strictly concave. Since there is a convex choice set, the social planner problem (4.23) has
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at most one solution. In the appendix we show that the maximization problem has indeed
a solution. Thus, there is a unique solution to the social planner problem (4.23), and
therefore a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. As proofed in the appendix, the solution
to the social planner’s problem has the following properties:
Proposition 4.4 (Optimal Taxes and Public Services).
Let {θt, µt, Tt}∞t=0, respectively {θt, µt, τct, τkt, τht}∞t=0, be the solution to the social
planner problem. If ση > 0 and νg > 0, the solution to the social planner problem is
characterized by:
(i.) Optimality of a stationary fiscal policy
(θt, µt, Tt) = (θ, µ, T )
and in particular
(θt, µt, τct, τkt, τht) = (θ, µg, τc, τk, τh)
(ii.) Optimality level of government spending
µ = νg
(iii.) Optimality of subsidizing total investment
T < 0
(iv.) Optimality of subsidizing human capital
τh < 0
Proof. The proof is deferred to the appendix.
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4.4 Optimal Taxation: Quantitative Analysis
4.4.1 Calibration
For our quantitative analysis, we use three different specifications of our model economy.
We calibrate the models such that the stationary equilibrium is consistent with stylized
annual facts of the US economy. In order to preserve the comparability of our results,
we recalibrate the model for each specification. The specifications are as follows: First,
households do not value leisure, νl = 0, and we normalize their labor supply to unity,
lit = 1. Furthermore, investment is solely bought by spending wealth, meaning φ = 0. This
is basically the model setup for which we derived the theoretical results in the previous
section. In the second specification, households value leisure, but there is still no human
capital investment through forgone earnings. Third, we impose the restriction that a
fraction φ = 0.25 of human capital investment is bought through foregone earnings. This
parameter value is consistent with the range of values found and applied by Trostel (1993).
Because the main contribution of our paper is to provide an argument that the optimal tax
rates are distortionary to the portfolio decision of the households, we choose an economic
environment without distortionary taxes as benchmark to which we calibrate the relevant
model parameters.10 Thus, τk = τh = 0.
We now calibrate the preference parameters. Since we are not interested in the welfare effect
of changes in the public good provision, we assume that the government already provides
the optimal amount of public consumption services. The optimality condition with respect
to public service provision is νg = µ.
11 Since µ = gtE[ct] , we simply set νg to the average
government consumption to private consumption ratio found in US time series: νg = 0.255.
In order to satisfy the government budget constraint, we moreover get τc = 0.255.
12 As
noted previously, the first model specification sets νl = 0. For the second and third model
specification, we choose νl such that the average labor supply in equilibrium amounts to
10This non-distortative tax rate on accumulable assets is actually the optimal tax system derived in a
Chamley-Judd economy.
11Actually, in section 4.3, we have shown that this condition holds for the first model specification.
However, it is straightforward to prove that this condition also extends to the more elaborated specifications
two and three.
12The government and private consumption time series includes years 1970 to 2009 and is taken from
the BEA NIPA tables.
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one third of the households’ time endowment. For both specifications, we find νl = 2.5568.
Finally, the time preference rate is set such that the equilibrium saving rate is 20 percent.
For the first specification, we get β = 0.9247 while specification two and three require
β = 0.9250.
The depreciation rates are set to δk = δh = 0.06. For physical capital, this value lies
within the range suggested by the literature, e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995). For human
capital, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) find annual depreciation rates between
0 and 4 percent. Accounting for the infinite horizon structure in our model, we have to
add an additional depreciation of 2 percent to capture full depreciation of human capital
after 50 years of work life. Thus, δh = 0.06 is at the upper bound of reasonable values
suggested in the literature. For the i.i.d. depreciation shock to human capital, we assume
that η ∼ N(µ, σ, a, a) with a and a denoting the lower and upper truncation point
of the distribution. We set a = −0.75 and a = 0.75 which guarantees the minimum
requirement on the domain of the η-distribution, η > −(1− δh) and E[η] = 0. Clearly, η is
a permanent human capital shock which translates into a permanent labor income shock
for the household. The evolution of the logarithm of labor income is governed by
log lnhi,t+1 = log ln(β [1 + r(θ, ηt; K˜
∗, τk, τh) ht])
≈ log ln β + log lnhit + r(θ, ηt; K˜∗, τk, τh)
= ω +
(1− θ) (1− φ τh)
1 + (1− β) νl ηt
with some constant ω which contains all terms that do not include the idiosyncratic human
capital depreciation shock. The logarithm of labor income follows approximately a random
walk with drift, and the mean and the standard deviation of the permanent component of
the logarithm of labor income are µyh = 0 and σyh =
(1−θ) (1−φ τh)
1+(1−β) νl ση. In the empirical
literature, the random walk specification is often used to model the permanent component
of labor income risk. For example, Carroll and Samwick (1997) find a standard deviation
of 0.147 whereas Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) estimate a value of 0.182. Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2004) additionally condition labor income risk on the business cycle
and find that labor income risk varies between 0.12 and 0.21. We calibrate ση such that in
equilibrium, permanent labor income risk exhibits a standard deviation of 0.15. This yields
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ση = 0.2532 in the first specification and ση = 0.3013 in the second and third specification.
The aggregate production technology is Cobb-Douglas with intensive form representation
f(K˜) = zK˜α. We set α = 0.36 to match the capital share of income according to the values
suggested in the literature. The technology parameter z is chosen such that in equilibrium,
aggregate consumption grows at two percent per annum. For the first specification, this
yields z = 0.3184 and for the second and third specification, we get z = 0.6386. The
calibration values are given in table 4.1, and the associated equilibrium allocations are
provided in table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Calibration
description (1) (2) (3) matches
α technology parameter 0.3600 0.3600 0.3600 capital share
δk, δh depreciation rates 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600
φ forgone earnings 0 0 0.2500
νg utility parameter 0.2550 0.2550 0.2550 government expenditure to
private consumption ratio
z technology parameter 0.3192 0.6442 0.6442 consumption growth rate 2%
β time preference rate 0.9230 0.9231 0.9231 saving rate 20%
σ sd depreciation shock 0.2602 0.3269 0.3269 labor income risk 0.15
νl utility parameter 0 2.4851 2.4851 labor supply E[li] = 1/3
4.4.2 Results
The optimal tax policy and its welfare and growth implications are given in table 4.2.
Welfare effects ∆W are computed according to Lucas (1987) in consumption equivalent
units. In the first model specification, the optimal capital and labor income tax rates are
2.0 and −2.5 percent, respectively. Due to a very strong general equilibrium effect, the
possibility to encourage more risk taking is limited. Specifically, reducing the labor income
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tax leads to a portfolio shift from physical to human capital. Consequently, the equilibrium
capital-to-labor ratio decreases thereby pushing the equilibrium interest rate upwards and
the equilibrium wage rate downwards and thus discourages human capital investment.
Taken together, the reduction of the tax rate on labor income induces a decrease in the
wage rate such that the effect of the tax policy on the net return to human capital is almost
offset. Clearly, following this line of argument, there is only a small spread between the
optimal tax rates leading to minor welfare gains of about 0.06 percent from implementing
the optimal tax system. Of course, in a small open economy where prices are exogenously
fixed by the international financial market, the general equilibrium effect would be absent
leading to more substantial welfare effects. In this sense, our framework establishes a lower
bound of the welfare effects.
Adding an endogenous labor-leisure choice helps to break the strong general equilibrium
effect. Reducing the labor income tax rate encourages both, investment into human capital
and labor supply. Clearly, investing into human capital becomes more profitable if the
household simultaneously increases his labor supply. The opposite holds as well: increasing
labor supply makes investment into human capital more profitable. This reinforcing effect
helps to overrule the general equilibrium effect more easily and for the calibrated model
economy, the optimal labor income tax drops to −9.5 percent whereas the optimal capital
income tax rises to 5.4 percent. The established spread between both tax rates of 14.9
percentage points leads to substantial welfare gains of 1.49 percent and the annual growth
rate rises by substantial 0.67 percentage points.
Imposing that 25 percent of human capital investment are payed by foregone earnings leads
to a stronger reduction of the optimal labor income tax compared to the previous result.
This result is due to the fact that the fraction of labor income that is invested through
foregone earnings is exempted from the labor income tax. Thus, subsidizing human capital
needs to take into account that a fraction of the subsidy is basically not payed out and
therefore raises labor income by a lower amount as in specification two. In other words,
the government has to rise labor income subsidy beyond the previous result in order to
encourage sufficient risk taking. The spread between capital and labor income tax increases
to 17 percent, the welfare gain, however, is slightly lower as before (because the policy is
not as effective as previously). The same holds for the growth effect.
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Table 4.2: Results
benchmark (1) (2) (3a) (3b)
optimal allocation
θ 0.4127 (0.4124) 0.4024 0.3751 0.3781 0.3600
E[li] 1 (1/3) 1 0.3645 0.3657 0.3451
optimal policy
τk 0 0.0198 0.0540 0.0510 0.0695
τh 0 -0.0249 -0.0950 -0.1188 0.1024
τc 0.2550 0.2768 0.3702 0.3869 0.2704
σh 0 0 0 0 0.2465
welfare/ growth effects (in percent/ percentage points)
4W 0.06 1.49 1.39 1.91
4γ∗c 0.14 0.67 0.62 0.80
Finally, we allow the government to encourage human capital investment more directly by
subsidizing the investment into human capital. Clearly, the direct policy dominates the
indirect policy. It even happens, that it is now optimal to tax labor income in order to
subsidize investment into human capital. The net effect on human capital accumulation,
however, remains positive, as can be seen from the decrease in the equilibrium portfolio
choice from 0.4124 to 0.3600. Thus, the government still wants to encourage more risk
taking by the private households. The optimal capital income tax and the optimal labor
income tax are 7.0 and 10.2 percent, respectively, and human capital investment is now
subsidized by 24.7 percent. Of course, giving the government one more instrument, it
cannot do worse. The welfare effect rises to substantial 1.9 percent while the annual
growth rate increases by substantial 0.8 percentage points.
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4.5 Conclusions
We have shown that first, there is a substantial amount of idiosyncratic risk and second,
governments provide a significant amount of non-wasteful consumption services, there is
too less investment into the risky asset, human capital,in the competitive equilibrium. The
social planner can thus implement a welfare improving tax policy that encourages more risk
taking (investment in human capital) by the households. However, there are strong general
equilibrium effects that may offset almost all benefits of subsidizing the risky asset, leading
to very small welfare and growth effects of the optimal policy. In our model with human
capital as the risky asset, introducing an endogenous labor leisure choice substantially
breaks the strong general equilibrium effect.
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4.A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4.4
For convenience, we rewrite
rt = θt [(1− τkt) rkt − δk] + (1− θt) [(1− τht) lt rht − δh + ηt]
= θt [rkt − δk] + (1− θt) [lt rht − δh]− θt τkt rkt − (1− θt) τht rht + (1− θt) ηt
=
{
θt [rkt − δk] + (1− θt) [lt rht − δh + ηt]
}
− Tt + (1− θt) ηt
and define the term in curly brackets as r¯(θt, ·). Thus,
rt = r¯(θt, ·)− Tt + (1− θt) ηt
With this notation, we now proceed with the proof of the proposition.
Step 1: the social planner’s first-order condition
The first order conditions of the social planner problem read
∂V˜ ({θt, µt, Tt}∞t=0)
∂µt
= −1 + νg
1 + µt
+
νg
µt
= 0 (4.24)
∂V˜ ({θt, µt, Tt}∞t=0)
∂Tt
= E
[
1
1 + r¯(θt, ·)− Tt + (1− θt)ηt
]
− (1 + νg) (1− β) β
(1− β)(1 + r¯(θt, ·)− Tt) + Tt −
(1− β − νgβ)
1 + r¯(θt, ·)− Tt = 0 (4.25)
∂V˜ ({θt, µt, Tt}∞t=0)
∂θt+1
= E
[
(rk(θt+1)− δk)− (rh(θt+1)− δh + ηt+1)
1 + r¯(θt+1, ·)− Tt+1 + (1− θt+1)ηt+1
]
+
(1 + νg) (1− β) (1− β) ((rk(θt+1)− δk)− (rh(θt+1)− δh))
(1− β)(1 + r¯(θt+1, ·)− Tt+1) + Tt+1
− (1− β − νgβ)(rk(θt+1)− δk)− (rh(θt+1)− δh)
1 + r¯(θt+1, ·)− Tt+1 = 0 (4.26)
Step 2: proof of part (i.) and (ii.)
Updating equation (4.25) and combining it with equation (4.26) reveals, that the allocation
(θt+1, Tt+1) only depends on period t + 1 variables and thus, (θt+1, Tt+1) = (θ, T ), ∀t.
Moreover, condition (4.24) immediately yields µt = νg, ∀t. Taken together, this proofs part
(i.) of the proposition, (θt, Tt) = (θ, T ) and (θt, µt, τct, τkt, τht) = (θ, µg, τc, τk, τh),
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respectively, and part (ii.) of the proposition, µt = νg.
Step 3: proof of part (iii.)
Updating (4.25) and combining it with (4.26) yields
E
[
η
1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T + (1− θ)η
]
= (1 + νg)(1− β) (rk(θ)− δk)− (rh(θ)− δh)
(1− β)(1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T ) + T (4.27)
where we dropped the time indices for convenience. It is easier to work with (4.27) instead
of (4.26). For simplicity, define
ΩT (θ, T ) = E
[
1
1 + r(θ, ·)− T + (1− θ)η
]
− (1 + νg) (1− β) β
(1− β)(1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T ) + T −
1− β − νgβ
1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T (4.28)
Ωθ(θ, T ) = E
[
η
1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T + (1− θ)η
]
− (1 + νg)(1− β) (rk(θ)− δk)− (rh(θ)− δh)
(1− β)(1 + r¯(θ, ·)− T ) + T (4.29)
We now have to show that there exists a (θ∗, T ∗) that solves ΩT (θ∗, T ∗) = 0 and Ωθ(θ∗, T ∗) =
0.
First, we show that for any θ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a T ∈ [T , 0] that solves equation (4.28).
Fix θ = θ¯ and T = −1−β
β
(1 + r¯(θ¯, ·)). Since r¯(θ¯, ·) is finite for any θ¯, the lower bound
T is well defined. We now apply the intermediate value theorem. On the one side, taking
the limit limT↘T ΩT (θ¯, T ), we find that the first and the third term are finite while the
second term goes to infinity. Thus, limT↘T ΩT (θ¯, T ) = −∞ < 0. On the other sides, we
evaluate ΩT (θ¯, T ) at t = 0 which yields
ΩT (θ¯, 0) = E
[
1
1 + r¯(θ¯) + (1− θ)η
]
− 1
1 + r¯(θ, ·)
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Due to strict convexity of 1
1+r(θ¯)+(1−θ)η in η, Jensen’s inequality leads to
ΩT (θ¯, 0) ≥ 1
1 + r¯(θ, ·) −
1
1 + r¯(θ, ·) = 0
Thus, ΩT (θ¯, 0) ≥ 0. Clearly, ΩT (θ¯, T ) is continuous on the domain of T . Applying the
intermediate value theorem yields that for any θ ∈ [0, 1], ∃ T ∈ [−1−β
β
(1 + max r¯(θ, ·)), 0]
that solves the first order condition with respect to T . Moreover, the map T = T (θ) is
continuous.
Next, we show that for the continuous map T = T (θ) defined previously, there exists
a solution θ that solves equation (4.27). By construction of T = T (θ), we know that
(1 − β)(1 + r¯(θ, ·) − T (θ)) + T (θ) > 0. In addition, using the natural restriction η ∈
[−(1 − δh),∞] together with T (θ) < 0 ensures 1 + r¯(θ, ·) − T + (1 − θ)η > 0. Thus, the
Inada conditions imply
lim
θ↗1
Ωθ(θ, T (θ)) = −∞
lim
θ↘0
Ωθ(θ, T (θ)) = +∞
Therefore, given T = T (θ), we know that there exists a θ ∈ [0, 1] that solves (4.27),
establishing the existence of an equilibrium (θ∗, T ∗) with T < 0.
Finally, by the Principle of Optimality we can establish uniqueness of the equilibrium
straightforwardly.
Step 4: proof of part (iv.)
We now show that it is always optimal to subsidize the risky asset, τh < 0. Strict concavity
of η
1+r¯(θ∗, ·)−T ∗+(1−θ∗)η in η and Jensen’s inequality imply
E
[
η
1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗ + (1− θ∗)η
]
<
E[η]
1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗ + (1− θ∗)E[η] = 0
By the upper and lower bounds on T , we know that (1− β)(1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗) + T ∗ > 0.
Hence, equation (4.27) implies (rk(θ
∗)−δk)− (rh(θ∗)−δh) ≤ 0. Now, we focus on equation
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(4.26): The second and third term can be rewritten as
((rk(θ
∗)− δk)− (rh(θ∗)− δh)) ν(1− β)(1 + r¯(θ
∗, ·))− (1− β − 2βν + ν)T ∗
((1− β)(1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗) + T ∗)(1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗)
Knowing that T ∗ ∈ [−1−β
β
(1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)), 0], we can show that that ν(1− β) (1 + r¯(θ∗, ·))−
(1−β−2βν+ν)T ∗ > 0. Therefore, the complete expression is negative such that equation
(4.26) implies
E
[
(rk(θ
∗)− δk)− (rh(θ∗)− δh + η)
1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗ + (1− θ∗)η
]
> 0 (4.30)
The optimal income tax rates (τk, τh) provide the incentive such that in competitive equi-
librium, it is optimal for each household to choose θ∗. Hence
0 = E
[
((1− τk)rk(θ∗)− δk)− ((1− τh)rh(θ∗)− δh + η)
1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗ + (1− θ∗)η
]
= E
[
(rk(θ
∗)− δk)− (rh(θ∗)− δh + η) + (τhrh(θ∗)− T ∗)1θ
1 + r¯(θ∗, ·)− T ∗ + (1− θ∗)η
]
Solving for τh yields
τh = −
E
[
θ∗((rk(θ∗)−δk)−(rh(θ∗)−δh+η))−T ∗
1+r¯(θ∗, ·)−T ∗+(1−θ∗)η
]
E
[
rh(θ∗)
1+r¯(θ∗, ·)−T ∗+(1−θ∗)η
]
By (4.30) and T ∗ < 0, we conclude that the numerator is positive. Multiplying with (-1)
and dividing by a positive number, we arrive at τh < 0, which finally proofs part (iv.) of
the proposition.
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